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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three chapters. In chapter one, using a rich dataset for
the United States, I estimate a series of models to document the birth order effects on
cognitive outcomes, non-cognitive outcomes, and parental investments. I estimate a
model that allows for heterogeneous birth order effects by unobservables to examine
how birth order effects varies across households. I find that first-born children score
0.2 of a standard deviation higher on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes than their
later-born siblings. They also receive 10% more in parental time, which accounts for
more than half of the differences in outcomes. I document that birth order effects
vary between 0.1 and 0.4 of a standard deviation across households with the effects
being smaller in households with certain characteristics such as a high income.
In chapter two, I build a model of intra-household resource allocation that en-
dogenously generates the decreasing birth order effects in household income with the
aim of using the model for counterfactual policy experiments. The model has a life-
cycle framework in which a household with two children confronts a sequence of time
constraints and a lifetime monetary constraint, and divides the available time and
monetary resources between consumption and investment. The counterfactual exper-
iment shows that an annual income transfer of 10,000 USD to low-income households
decreases the birth order effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills by one-sixth,
which is five times bigger than the effect in high-income household.
In chapter three, with Francesco Agostinelli and Matthew Wiswall, we examine
the relative importance of investments at home and at school during an important
transition for many children, entering formal schooling at kindergarten. Moreover,
our framework allows for complementarities between children’s skills and investments
from schools. We find that investments from schools are an important determinant of
children’s skills at the end of kindergarten, whereas parental investments, although
i
strongly correlated with end-of-kindergarten outcomes, have smaller effects. In ad-
dition, we document a negative complementarity between children’s skills at kinder-
garten entry and investments from schools, implying that low-skill children benefit
the most from an increase in the quality of schools.
ii
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Chapter 1
THE EFFECT OF BIRTH ORDER ON CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT
1.1 Introduction
Decades of research in economics and other disciplines have documented differ-
ences in many socio-economic indicators by order of birth. 1 In this chapter, using a
rich dataset for the United States, I estimate a series of models in order to document
the birth order effects on cognitive outcomes, non-cognitive outcomes, and parental
investments during childhood development. I also estimate models that allow for het-
erogeneous birth order effects by unobservables (household fixed effects) to examine
how the birth order effects vary across households.
I find that first-born children score 0.2 of a standard deviation higher on cognitive
and non-cognitive outcomes than their later-born siblings. They also receive 0.1 of
standard deviation more in parental investments as measured by parental time. More-
over, naive regressions show that the birth order effects on parental time account for
more than half of the birth order effects on outcomes. I document that birth order
effects are heterogeneous and vary between 0.1 and 0.4 of a standard deviation across
households with the effects being smaller in households with certain characteristics
such as a high income. The literature assumes homogeneous birth order effects across
households with the exception of Buckles and Munnich (2012) which find hetero-
1Some examples include cognitive outcomes (Lehmann et al., 2016; Monfardini and See, 2012;
Heiland, 2009), non-cognitive outcomes (Black et al., 2017), educational attainment (Bu, 2014;
Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2006; Black et al., 2005), adult earnings (Kantarevic and Mechoulan,
2006), risky behavior such as smoking, drinking, or copulating (Argys et al., 2006; Rodgers et al.,
1992), delinquency outcomes (Breining et al., 2017), physical health, mental health, and happiness
(Black et al., 2016), all-cause and cause-specific mortality risk (Barclay and Kolk, 2015), and suicide
risk (Rostila et al., 2014).
1
geneity in the effects by birth spacing. Documenting the heterogeneity in the birth
order effects along various dimensions is important and it helps us to understand the
underlying mechanisms that generate the effects.
Subsequent sections of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly
summarizes the literature. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 documents the
evidence on the birth order effects. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Previous Research
There are three main hypotheses that have been put forward to explain the ob-
served differences between siblings: differences in initial endowments among children,
differences in monetary and time resources allocated to children, and differences in
household environment and parenting practices among children.
The first group of literature focuses on maternal behavior during prenatal and
neonatal development periods. This literature argues that differences in prenatal
and neonatal investments cause the differences in initial endowments which, in turn,
cause the differences in outcomes. There is evidence that mothers are more likely to
engage in risky prenatal behavior, such as alcohol or cigarette consumption, during
later pregnancies in comparison with the earlier pregnancies (Lehmann et al., 2016;
Kleinman and Madans, 1985). There is also evidence that mothers are less likely to
breastfeed later-born children in comparison with earlier-born children (Buckles and
Kolka, 2014).
The second group of literature is concerned with resource dilution (Becker and
Tomes, 1976; Becker and Lewis, 1973). This literature claims that differences in allo-
cated time and monetary resources across siblings causes the differences in outcomes.
For example, there is evidence that later-born children have fewer investment goods
at home, such as books (Lehmann et al., 2016; Booth and Kee, 2009; Blake, 1981).
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There is also evidence that parents spend less time with the later-born children in
comparison with the earlier-born children (Pavan, 2015; Monfardini and See, 2012;
Price, 2008).
The third group of literature concentrates on the household environment and
parenting practices. The family mental confluence model posits that a child with a
higher birth order is born in a household with a lower mental age in comparison to
a child with a lower birth order and, therefore, they have a lower rate of intellectual
growth than their older siblings (Zajonc, 2001, 1976; Zajonc and Markus, 1975).
There is also literature on parenting practices which postulates that parents are more
strict with the earlier-born children, which results in better outcomes, in order to
establish a reputation of toughness to deter bad behavior among later-born children.
For example, parents have less rigid rules about watching television and monitoring
homework for later-born children (Hotz and Pantano, 2015; Hao and Jin, 2008).
1.3 Data
The data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child
Development Supplement (CDS). The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal
study of US families which began in 1968. It was conducted annually through 1997
and biennially ever since. The PSID collects data on the “head” and the “wife” of
the household and has information on employment, income, marriage, and fertility.
The CDS was introduced in 1997 to study the development of children. It ran-
domly selected up to two children aged 12 or younger per PSID Family Units with
two follow-ups in 2002 and 2007. The CDS includes about 3600 children from 2400
households. It contains data on children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, parental
investments in children’s skills, and children’s investments in their own skills.
A close dataset to the PSID-CDS is the National Longitudinal Study of Youth
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(NLSY). The birth order differences in outcomes that I find using the PSID-CDS are
similar to those documented using the NLSY (Pavan, 2015). The CDS is preferable
as it has better investment measures. The NLSY measures parental investments by
asking parents for the frequency of a selected activities while the CDS also includes
time diaries of children activities. Time diary is a more objective measure of parental
investments than activity frequency as they measure what parents actually do as op-
posed to what parents claim they do; therefore, time diary is an important component
of this study.
1.3.1 Sample
The sample includes all households in the CDS who have two children as of 2015.
I focus on households with two children to rule out family size effects, which is an
important confounding factor with birth order, and to simplify the modeling of birth
order effects, which is the subject of Chapter 2. Households that have a twin are
excluded from the sample because birth order is not well defined for twins. In addition,
households that have adopted a child are also removed from the sample. The evidence
on birth order effects is replicated using the sample of households with three or
fewer children and is included in Appendix A.6. Generally, the qualitative results are
similar.
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample in the first wave of the
CDS. The sample is composed of 1258 children from 862 households; 2 although, it
varies by some outcomes because of non-response to certain questions. The children
are on average 6.6 years old. Fifty percent are male. About fifty-seven percent are
2There are three types of households in the sample: first, households that had two children
younger than 12 in 1997 and did not give birth to another child (both children are observed);
second, households that had one child younger than 12 and another child older than 12 in 1997 and
did not give birth to additional children (only the second child is observed); third, households that
had one child younger than 12 in 1997 and gave birth to a child afterward (only the first child is
observed).
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White non-Hispanic, thirty-three percent are Black non-Hispanic, and five percent
are Hispanic. In addition, sixty-nine percent of the children live with their biological
parents. Mothers are on average 33.4 years old and have had their first pregnancy at
24 years of age. They have an average of 14 years of education and work an average
of 25 hours per week. The average household income is 50,000 in 1996 USD. Note
that Whites are underrepresented and Blacks are overrepresented in the sample as
PSID has an over sample of low-income households.
1.3.2 Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Scales
Panels A and B of Table 1.2 present the descriptive statistics for cognitive and
non-cognitive scores in the first wave of the CDS, respectively. For all three waves
of the CDS, three subtests of the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-
Revised (WJ-R) were administered to children aged three years or older: the Letter-
Word Identification (LWI), which assesses symbolic learning and reading identification
skills, the Passage Comprehension (PC), 3 which assesses vocabulary and reading
comprehension, and the Applied Problems (AP), which assesses mathematics reason-
ing and knowledge. The CDS also has two non-cognitive scales: the Behavior Problem
Scale (BPS), which measures the incidence and severity of child behavior problems,
and the Positive Behavior Scale (PBS), which measures the positive aspects. The
BPS is borrowed from NLSY and has the advantage that it has been well used by
economists (Cunha et al., 2010). Both of the scales were administered to parents of
children aged three years or older in all waves of data collection. One limitation of
these scales, and other cognitive and non-cognitive scales in general, is that they have
a bounded range. This may result in the ceiling effects, which occurs when a child
cannot score more than the maximum available points. Appendix A.1 demonstrates
3PC is administered to children aged six years or older.
5
that the findings are robust to the ceiling effects.
1.3.3 Parental Investments
Panel C of Table 1.2 summarizes measures of parental investments in the first wave
of the CDS. The CDS contains several instruments that measure parental investments
including a Time Diary, which is a chronological report of a child’s activities over a
24-hour period that records the activity, duration, location, active participants, and
passive participants. Two time diaries are available for each child, one for a random
weekday and another for a random weekend day.
For this study, I focus on the total active time that children spend with their
parents (biological or step) measured as the weighted sum of the weekday and the
weekend durations with weights of five and two, respectively. I further break down
each measure of parental time by sibling participation. Specifically, if a sibling is an
active or a passive participant of an activity, then the time is measured as parental
shared time, otherwise, it is measured as parental alone time. All the birth order
effects on parental active time qualitatively hold for parental passive time and are
included in Appendix A.3. The birth order effects on alternative measures of parental
investments in the CDS are included in Appendix A.4.
1.4 Evidence on Birth Order Effects
In this section, I estimate a series of models in order to document the effect of
birth order on cognitive outcomes, non-cognitive outcomes, and parental investments.
I also examine how much of the birth order effects on outcomes is explained by the
birth order effects in parental investments. I conclude this section by estimating a
model that allow for heterogeneity by unobservables (household fixed effects) in order
to examine how the birth order effects vary across households.
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1.4.1 Differences in Outcomes
The baseline identification strategy exploits the within household variation. Let
i ∈ {1, 2} denote the order of birth, h denote the household, and consider the following
equation:
Si,h = γ0qh + γ11{i = 2}+Xi,hγ2 + i,h (1.1)
where Si,h is a child’s outcome, qh is the household fixed effects, 1{i = 2} is an
indicator for the second-born children, Xi,h is a vector that includes child specific
variables such as gender, age, age squared, and an intercept, and i,h is the error
term. 4 Household fixed effects, qh, stands for all household characteristics that
do not vary across children. Specifically, it includes important confounding factors
with birth order such as household size, mother’s age at birth, and birth spacing
of the household (age difference between siblings). Without any loss of generality, I
normalize the mean of qh to zero and its standard deviation to one.
5 The coefficient
of interest is γ1 which is the effect of being born second on Si,h relative to the first
child.
The within transformation for children in household h is the difference between
the first and second child outcomes, that is:
S1,h − S2,h = γ1 + (X1,h −X2,h)γ2 + 1,h − 2,h (1.2)
This removes the household fixed effects, qh. Under the assumption that E[1,h −
2,h|X1,h − X2,h] = 0, γ’s are identified and can be estimated using OLS. Since the
4I have also estimated models with age dummy variables, and there is little difference in the
results. I do it this way to be consistent with models that allow for heterogeneity in the birth
order effects by the unobservable, qh, in which the computation time increases dramatically with
additional variables.
5In typical fixed effect analyses, γ0 = 1 and the standard deviation of the fixed effect is allowed
to be free. I have chosen a different normalization here for ease of interpretation.
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identification strategy uses within household variation, it is robust to unobserved
household characteristics that do not vary by birth order. For example, the birth
order may be correlated with household lifetime monetary resources, which is an
unobservable to the researcher. Then, the naive OLS estimate of γ1 is biased while
FE estimate is unbiased.
Equation 1.2 can also be written as:
S1,h − S2,h = ∆h + (X1,h −X2,h)γ2 (1.3)
where ∆h = γ1+(1,h−2,h) is the difference between outcomes of the first and second
child in household h adjusted for age and gender. Then, γ1 is the expectation of ∆h
in the population, γ1 = E(∆h), where ∆h is the heterogeneous birth order effect and
γ1 is the homogenous birth order effects.
Table 1.3 displays estimates of γ1 for various cognitive and non-cognitive out-
comes. 6 I have pooled data from all three waves of the CDS to maximize the
number of observations. I have also rescaled each outcome by its respective standard
deviation at age seven, the approximate average age in the first wave of the CDS, to
facilitate interpretation of the units. 7
Panel A demonstrates that second-born children score lower than their first-born
siblings on the three cognitive outcomes. The effects are 0.26 of a standard deviation
on the Letter-Word Identification test, 0.19 of a standard deviation on the Paragraph
Comprehension test, and 0.10 of a standard deviation on the Applied Problems test;
although, the latter is imprecisely estimated. The effects represent three, four, and
two months of development, respectively. Pavan (2015) finds similar magnitudes, 0.15
6Appendix A.2 merges the PSID-CDS with the Transition into Adulthood Supplement (TAS) to
examine the birth order effects on Adult outcomes, such as college attendance, years of education,
and wages.
7There is some variation in the standard deviation of the outcomes over the age, but the variation
is small. For most outcomes the standard deviation at age seven is also about the average of standard
deviations over the age.
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to 0.18 of a standard deviation, on cognitive outcomes available in the NLSY.
Panel B demonstrates that second-born children also score lower than their first-
born siblings on non-cognitive outcomes, although some of the effects are imprecisely
estimated. For example, second-born children score 0.14 and 0.13 of a standard
deviation lower on the Dependent and the Peer Problems, respectively. Black et al.
(2017) documents that second-born boys score 0.11 of a standard deviation lower than
their first-born brothers on non-cognitive outcomes using the population of eighteen-
year-old Swedish men.
1.4.2 Differences in Parental Investments
Figure 1.1 plots maternal and paternal time by birth order, type (alone or shared),
and age. There is a considerable difference in the type of time that first- and second-
born children receive over their developments. First-born children receive more ma-
ternal and paternal alone time while they receive less maternal and paternal shared
time relative to their second-born siblings. This is not surprising given that first-
born children enjoy undivided attention of parents until second-born children are
born. The differences are also greater early in development, which is a critical period
of skill formation in children (Heckman and Masterov, 2007). I quantify the magni-
tudes using the following model. Let i ∈ {1, 2} denote the order of birth and h denote
the household:
Pi,h = γ11{i = 2}+ γ21{i = 2}Ai,h + γ31{i = 2}A2i,h +Xi,hγ4 + i,h (1.4)
where Pi,h is a measure of parental time, 1{i = 2} is an indicator for the second-born
children, Ai,h is the child’s age, Xi,h is a vector that includes gender, age, age squared,
mother’s age at birth, mother’s years of education, and an intercept, and i,h is the
error term. The birth order effect equals to γ1 + γ2Ai,h + γ3A
2
i,h. γ1 is the effect of
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being born second on Pi,h relative to the first child at birth, while γ2Ai,h + γ3A
2
i,h
governs how the effect varies over development. 8
Table 1.4 displays the results. Columns 1 and 3 demonstrate that second-born
children receive 21.2 and 14.8 hours per week less maternal and paternal alone time
at birth relative to first-born children while, on average, the effects decrease by 1.0
and 0.8 of an hour per week for every year of development. The average marginal
effects of being born second on maternal and paternal alone time are 0.4 and 1.1 of
an hour less per week over development, respectively. In contrast, columns 2 and 4
show that second-born children receive 19.6 and 8.2 hours per week more maternal
and paternal shared time while, on average, the effects decrease by 0.9 and 0.4 hours
per week for every year of development. However, the average of marginal effect is
negative; that is, second-born children receive an average of 0.7 and 0.9 of an hour
less of maternal and paternal shared time per week over development.
Overall, second-born children receive an average of 1.1 hours per week less mater-
nal time and another 2.0 hours per week less paternal time over development relative
to their first-born siblings. 9 On average, mothers and fathers spend a total of 30
hours per week with a child over her development. Therefore, second-born children
receive 10% less parental time over development relative to their first-born siblings.
Price (2008) using American Time Use Survey documents that parents spend 2.3 hour
per week less “quality” time with second-born than the first-born children. 10
8Notice that I use OLS instead of FE to identify the model. This is necessary because parental
time is a flow variable (as opposed to skill that is a stock variable) and the design of the CDS only
allows FE to identify the effect of being born second on parental time for periods that both children
live in the household. However, an important part of the comparison between the two children are
the periods that the first child is the only child in the household with the corresponding periods in
the second child’s development.
9There are also birth order differences on how children allocate their time among different ac-
tivities. Appendix A.5 documents that second-born children watch more television relative to their
first-born siblings.
10Quality parental time is a subset of parental time.
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1.4.3 Decomposing Birth Order Effects
In this section, I estimate the portion of the birth order effects on cognitive and
non-cognitive outcomes that is explained by the differences in the lagged outcomes
and parental investments between children. Let i ∈ {1, 2} denote the order of birth,
h denote the household, t denote time, and consider the following “value added”
equation:
Si,h,t+5 = γ11{i = 2}+Xi,h,tγ2 + γ3Si,h,t + γ4S ′i,h,t + Pi,h,tγ5 + i,h,t (1.5)
where Si,h,t is a cognitive (non-cognitive) outcome, S
′
i,h,t is a non-cognitive (cognitive)
outcome, Pi,h,t is a vector of parental investments that includes maternal alone time
and maternal shared time, 1{i = 2} is an indicator for the second-born children, Xi,h,t
is a vector that includes gender, age, age squared, mother’s age at birth, mother’s
years of education and an intercept, and i,h,t is the error term.
11 The coefficient of
interest is γ1, which is the effect of being born second on Si,h,t+5 relative to the first
child after adjusting for lagged scores and parental investments. Note that two con-
secutive data collections in the CDS are five years apart, which means that parental
investments in periods t+ 1 to t+ 4 are omitted variables in equation (1.5).
In estimating equation (1.5), I control for the inherent measurement error in the
standardized tests. In particular, for each cognitive (non-cognitive) outcome I use
another cognitive (non-cognitive) outcome as an instrument, assuming that the two
cognitive (non-cognitive) outcomes are independent measurements of the same latent
cognitive (non-cognitive) skills, plus an additively separable measurement error that
is uncorrelated across the two outcomes. Similarly, I use paternal time to control for
the measurement error in maternal time under the same assumption.
Table 1.5 displays the estimates of γ1. Columns 1 to 3 show the estimates for the
11Notice that I use OLS instead of FE to estimate (1.5). See footnote 8.
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three cognitive outcomes: Letter-Word Identification, Passage Comprehension, and
Applied Problems. Panel A reports the baseline birth order effects, i.e., not control-
ling for the lagged outcomes or parental investments. Panel B displays the birth order
effects controlling for the lagged outcomes and parental investments. The estimates
demonstrate that the differences in lagged cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes and
parental investments between siblings account for at least one-half of the birth or-
der effects in Letter-Word Identification and Applied Problems tests and all of the
difference in Passage Comprehension test. Pavan (2015) using the NLSY concludes
that differences in parental investments approximately explain half of the birth order
effects in cognitive outcomes.
Columns 4 and 5 display the estimates for the two non-cognitive outcomes: the
Dependent and the Peer Problems scales. Comparison of the estimates in Panel A
with the estimates in Panel B demonstrates that the differences in lagged cognitive
and non-cognitive outcomes and parental investments between siblings account for
one-half of the birth order effects in each of the outcomes. Black et al. (2017) using
the population of eighteen-year-old Swedish men documents that two-fifth of the birth
order effects in non-cognitive outcomes are accounted by the differences in cognitive
outcomes. The portion of the birth order effects explained by the lagged outcomes
and parental investments is noteworthy given that parental investments in periods
t+ 1 to t+ 4 are unobserved and therefore omitted from equation (1.5).
1.4.4 Heterogeneity in Birth Order Effects
In this section, I allow for heterogeneity in the birth order effects. It is important
to know whether or not the birth order effects vary across households in any dimen-
sion. Documenting heterogeneity helps to formulate conjectures about the underlying
causes of the birth order effects.
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I allow for heterogeneity by augmenting the baseline specification in equation
(1.1). In particular, I include the interaction of the household fixed effects and the
second-born children indicator in the model:
Si,h = γ0qh + γ11{i = 2}+ γ2qh1{Bi,h = 2}+Xi,hγ3 + i,h (1.6)
where Si,h is the child’s outcome, qh is the household fixed effect, 1{i = 2} is an
indicator for the second-born children, Xi,h is a vector that includes child specific
variables such as gender, age, age squared, and an intercept, and i,h is the error
term. The birth order effect equals to γ1 +γ2qh. γ1 is the average effect of being born
second on Si,h relative to the first child, or the average birth order effect. γ2 is the
effect of one standard deviation increase in the household fixed effect on the birth
order effect relative to the average effect. If γ2 = 0, then there is no heterogeneity
and the effect is the same across households. However, if γ2 > 0 (< 0), then the
birth order effect is heterogeneous and is smaller in households with a higher (lower)
qh. Note that equation (1.6) only determines whether or not birth order effects are
heterogeneous. To characterize the attributes of households that have smaller birth
order effects, it is necessary to go one step further and regress the estimated household
fixed effects on observable characteristics of the households. This last step suffers from
the standard omitted variable bias.
It is possible to model heterogeneity by observables. Modeling heterogeneity by
unobservables is a superior method in the sense that it is robust to the omitted
variable bias and attenuation bias. However, it is not trivial to estimate specification
(1.6). The model is non-linear in the household fixed effects, qh, and therefore, the
within-household transformation cannot identify the model. But, one can recover the
coefficients and the distribution of the fixed effects by dividing the estimation into
two steps. In the first step, given a guess for the household fixed effects, estimate the
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coefficients using ordinary least squares. In the second step, given the coefficients,
estimate the household fixed effects and iterate until two consecutive estimates of
the coefficients are sufficiently close. Under the assumption that E[i,h|qh] = 0, the
iterative procedure is a consistent estimator of the coefficients of interest γ1 and γ2
(Arcidiacono et al., 2012).
Table 1.6 presents the estimates. The average birth order effect on cognitive
(Letter-Word Identification test) and non-cognitive (Dependent scale) outcomes is
0.26 and 0.14 of a standard deviation, respectively. In addition, the table displays
that the coefficient of the interaction term is positive which means that the birth order
effect is smaller in households with a higher fixed effects, qh. One standard deviation
increase in the household fixed effects decreases the birth order effect on cognitive and
non-cognitive outcomes by 0.08 and 0.17 of a standard deviation, respectively. The
average and the standard deviation of distribution of the marginal effects are both
displayed at the bottom of the table. Figure 1.2 plots the distribution of the birth
order effects against the household fixed effects percentiles. The birth order effects on
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes at the tenth-percentile of the distribution are
0.36 and 0.38 of a standard deviation while the corresponding effects at the ninetieth-
percentile of the distribution are 0.18 and 0.01 of a standard deviation.
Table 1.7 displays the regressions of estimated household’s cognitive and non-
cognitive fixed effects on household’s observable characteristics. The table demon-
strates that presence of both biological parents, an increase in mother’s years of
education, and an increase in household’s income is associated with a smaller birth
order effects. In contrast, an increase in household’s number of boys or an increase in
household’s birth spacing is associated with a larger birth order effects. Buckles and
Munnich (2012) using the NLSY document that an increase in birth spacing increases
the differences in outcomes of the siblings. Note that these regressions characterize
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the attributes of households with smaller/larger birth order effects, but they suffer
from the standard omitted variable bias. For example, a household with a higher
income may have parents with higher ability. But ability is not observed and if it is
correlated with income, then the estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Therefore,
the magnitudes should not be interpreted as the causal effects.
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I document that first-born children score 0.2 of a standard de-
viation higher on both cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes than their second-born
siblings. Furthermore, first-born children receive 0.1 of a standard deviation more
in parental investments. The birth order effects on parental time account for more
than half of the birth order effects on outcomes. In addition, I document that birth
order effects are heterogeneous and vary between 0.1 and 0.4 of a standard deviation
with the effects being smaller in households with certain characteristics such as a high
income.
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1.6 Figures
Figure 1.1: Active Parental Time by Birth Order and Age in 1997
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Notes: Alone time denotes absence of a sibling while shared time denotes presence
of a sibling.
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Figure 1.2: Heterogeneity in Birth Order Effects
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Note: BOE denotes the birth order effect and is defined as the difference
between the second and the first child scores.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics in 1997
Mean Std. Dev.
A: Characteristics of Children
Number of children 1258
Age 6.65 3.73
Fraction male 0.50
Fraction White, Non-Hispanic 0.57
Fraction Black, Non-Hispanic 0.33
Fraction Hispanic 0.05
Fraction other Race/Ethnicity 0.04
Fraction living with both biological parents 0.69
Fraction living with only biological mother 0.28
Fraction living with only biological father 0.02
Fraction living with no biological parents 0.01
B: Characteristics of Households
Number of households 862
Mother’s age 33.40 6.82
Mother’s age at first pregnancy 24.13 5.06
Mother’s years of schooling 13.96 2.09
Mother’s hours worked per week 24.79 17.06
Household income (10,000 1996USD) 5.00 4.42
Source: the PSID-CDS.
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Table 1.2: Children Outcomes and Parental Investments in 1997
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A: Cognitive Outcomes
Letter-Word Identification 777 28.28 16.65 0 57
Paragraph Comprehension 518 21.36 8.11 0 39
Applied Problems 773 25.05 11.87 0 53
B: Non-Cognitive Outcomes
Dependent 976 2.59 0.43 1 3
Peer Problems 976 2.86 0.28 1 3
C: Parental Time
Maternal Alone 1002 10.84 14.56 0 77
Maternal Shared 1002 13.54 12.52 0 70
Paternal Alone 1002 5.04 9.59 0 77
Paternal Shared 1002 7.51 9.13 0 51
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Cognitive outcomes are the raw scores. Non-cognitive outcomes are rated by parents on
a scale of 1 to 3; 1=Often true, 2=Sometimes true, 3=Not true. Parental time is measured in
hours/week.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Being Born Second on Outcomes
Outcome OLS FE
A: Cognitive Outcomes
Letter-Word Identification -0.121*** -0.259***
(0.037) [2251] (0.074) [2251]
Paragraph Comprehension -0.080** -0.190**
(0.038) [1960] (0.077) [1960]
Applied Problems -0.154*** -0.104
(0.057) [2244] (0.100) [2244]
F-statistic 9.42*** 8.59***
B: Non-Cognitive Outcomes
Dependent -0.083** -0.136*
(0.041) [2586] (0.081) [2586]
Peer Problems -0.069 -0.128
(0.046) [2586] (0.101) [2586]
F-statistic 3.67** 2.61*
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regression. All outcomes are rescaled
by standard deviation at age seven. The scale of non-cognitive outcomes is reversed so
that a higher score is a better outcome. Models control for child’s gender, child’s age and
age squared, mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at birth. Number of children
are in brackets. Household-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The null
hypothesis for the F-test is that being born second has zero effect on all of the outcomes.
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Table 1.4: Effect of Being Born Second on Active Parental Time
Maternal Paternal
Alone Shared Alone Shared
1{birth order=2} -21.20*** 19.61*** -14.82*** 8.22***
(2.287) (1.500) (1.750) (1.051)
1{birth order=2} × age 3.62*** -3.66*** 2.37*** -1.61***
(0.417) (0.308) (0.310) (0.223)
1{birth order=2} × age2 -0.13*** 0.14*** -0.08*** 0.06***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
Average Marginal Effects -0.43 -0.69 -1.12 -0.93
N-Children 2435 2435 2435 2435
N-Households 1744 1744 1744 1744
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Time is measured in hours per week. Models control for child’s gender, child’s age and
age squared, mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at birth. Household-clustered stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Decomposing Birth Order Effects on Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Baseline
1{birth order=2} -0.156*** -0.102* -0.139** -0.110** -0.063
(0.055) (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.054)
B: Adding Parental Investments
1{birth order=2} -0.082 -0.005 -0.072 -0.033 0.010
(0.056) (0.048) (0.057) (0.046) (0.049)
N-Children 1474 1442 1471 1610 1610
N-Households 697 692 696 744 744
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regression. Cognitive outcomes are:
1=Letter-Word Identification, 2=Paragraph Comprehension, 3=Applied Problems. Non-
cognitive outcomes are: 4=Dependent, 5=Peer Problems. The scale of non-cognitive outcomes
is reversed so that a higher score is a better outcome. All outcomes are rescaled by stan-
dard deviation at age seven. Models control for child’s gender, child’s age and age squared,
mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at birth. Household-clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneity in Birth Order Effects
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
A: Estimates
1{birth order=2} -0.264*** -0.143*
(0.068) (0.087)
[-0.391,-0.160] [-0.290,-0.023]
q × 1{birth order=2} 0.076* 0.166***
(0.043) (0.056)
[0.009,0.150] [0.096,0.279]
B: Marginal Effects
Average -0.26 -0.14
Standard Deviation 0.08 0.17
N-Children 2251 2586
N-Households 1529 1747
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Cognitive outcome is Letter-Word identification test. Non-Cognitive outcome is De-
pendent scale. The scale of the non-cognitive outcome is reversed so that a higher score is a
better outcome. Outcomes are rescaled by standard deviation at age seven. q is the house-
hold fixed effect and is normalized to have mean of zero standard deviation of one. Regres-
sions control for child’s gender, child’s age, and child’s age squared. Bootstrapped standard
errors are in parentheses. 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **,
and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Determinants of Households Fixed Effects
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
1{number of boys=1} -0.095 -0.127**
(0.062) (0.060)
1{number of boys=2} -0.167** -0.130*
(0.072) (0.069)
1{household is intact=1} 0.277*** 0.311***
(0.056) (0.053)
spacing (years) 0.003 -0.018***
(0.007) (0.007)
mother’s education (years) 0.123*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.012)
household’s income (10,000 USD) 0.015*** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
N-Households 1529 1747
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Regressions are at the household level. Regressions include missing indicators.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from
zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 2
THE EFFECT OF CASH TRANSFERS ON BIRTH ORDER EFFECTS
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 demonstrates that there are birth order effects on cognitive and non-
cognitive outcomes during childhood development. A natural question that follows
this finding is that how does birth order affect a child’s outcome? And perhaps, just
as importantly, how can we alleviate the birth order effects? Although economists
have long examined the implications of intra-household allocation of resources among
partners, for example, consumption goods (Lise and Seitz, 2011; Browning et al.,
1994), or market and house work (A´lvarez and Miles, 2003; Hersch and Stratton,
1994), they have only recently begun to analyze the implications of intra-household
allocation of resources among children (Pavan, 2015; Del Boca et al., 2013, 2016).
This chapter contributes to the growing literature by developing a model of intra-
household resource allocation (time and money) that endogenously generates the
birth order effects. My modeling framework also allows estimation of counterfactual
policy experiments in which the government uses targeted transfers to reduce intra-
household inequality.
The model has a life-cycle framework in which a household with two children con-
fronts a sequence of time constraints and a lifetime monetary constraint, and divides
the available time and monetary resources between consumption and investment. The
birth order effects arise in the model as a result of two theoretical and one empirical
feature. The theoretical features include: time is a resource that cannot be saved
or borrowed, and that, the first-born child has the undivided attention of the house-
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hold early in development while the second-born child has the same opportunity late
in development. What gives importance to the theoretical features is the empiri-
cal feature. Productivity of investments are higher early in development (Heckman
and Masterov, 2007). Heterogeneity in the birth order effects arises as a result of
heterogeneity in household’s income, concavity of preferences, and concavity of the
technologies of skill formation (diminishing marginal products of investments). Intu-
itively, households invest more monetary resources in their children as their income
increases, but these additional investments are more productive for the second-born
child relative to the first-born child because they have lower skills.
The model builds on Del Boca et al. (2013, 2016). I augment their model in two
dimensions which are important in understanding the birth order effects. First, I allow
for saving and borrowing which is a margin that enables the household to transfer
money across time and between siblings. Second, I incorporate non-cognitive skills.
A closely related study to my model is Pavan (2015) which uses a dynamic latent
factor model to estimate the portion of birth order effects in cognitive outcomes that
is explained by parental investments. However, the author does not explicitly model
household choices. Therefore, the setup is unable to address the counterfactual policy
experiments that I have in mind. My counterfactual experiments demonstrate that
income transfers reduce the birth order effects, but they are most effective when they
target low-income households. The model shows that an annual income transfer of
10,000 USD to low-income households decreases the birth order effects on cognitive
and non-cognitive skills by one-sixth, which is five times bigger than the effect in
high-income household.
Subsequent sections of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 2.2 intro-
duces a life-cycle model of endogenous birth order effects. Section 2.3 elaborates
the econometric details. Section 2.4 discusses the results and counterfactual policy
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experiments. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Model
In this section, I develop a life-cycle model of intra-household resource allocation
that endogenously generates the heterogeneous birth order effects with the goal of
using the model for counterfactual policy experiments. This model rationalizes the
two empirical facts that I established in Chapter 1: there is a birth order effect in
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes which negatively affects second-born children,
and that, these effects are smaller in households with certain characteristics such as
a high income. The following subsections elaborates on the details of the model.
2.2.1 Environment
The model is parsimonious and focuses on intra-household allocation of resources.
For simplicity, the model considers households that have two children. Households
live for T periods. Their life begins at t1 = 1 with the birth of the first child. At t2,
the second child joins the unit. At t3 = M , development of the first child ends and
they leave the unit. Finally, at t4 = t2 +M − 1 = T , development of the second child
ends and households die. The timeline of the events is:
t1
Birth of 1
Birth of 2
t2
t3
Exit of 1
Exit of 2
t4 = T
Households care about consumption, “leisure”, and skills of their children which
are composed of cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions. They own age-specific tech-
nologies that combine the initial skills, time investments, and monetary investments
into the next period’s skills. The households are endowed with a unit of time and
an exogenous income. They allocate the time endowment among leisure, time invest-
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ments in the first child alone, time investments in the second child alone, or time
investments in both children concurrently. In addition, the households allocate the
income endowment among consumption, monetary investments in the first child, or
monetary investments in the second child. The households can also borrow or save
at a competitive interest rate, which enables them to transfer monetary resources be-
tween periods. Households are homogeneous with respect to preferences, technologies,
and time endowment, but they are heterogeneous in income endowment.
This model improves upon the literature by adding non-cognitive skills and allow-
ing households to borrow or save (Pavan, 2015; Del Boca et al., 2013). Non-cognitive
skills are as important as cognitive skills in explaining adult outcomes (Heckman
et al., 2006; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001). Borrowing or saving can be an im-
portant margin for households to transfer income across time and between children,
which is important for the question at hand. The model takes fertility as an exogenous
variable similar to the literature. Fertility decisions are potentially important for the
results since households know about the birth order effects and they may choose to
space their children differently in response to the effects (Buckles and Munnich, 2012;
Rosenzweig, 1986).
2.2.2 Preferences
Households have a “parent” decision maker which has preferences over consump-
tion, leisure and skills of children. Their utility flow at time t has a nested Cobb-
Douglas form given by:
u(ct, `t, θ
1
t+1, θ
2
t+1) = α1 log ct + α2 log `t + α3 log θ
1
t+1 + α4 log θ
2
t+1 (2.1)
where c is the parent’s consumption, ` is the parent’s leisure (non-child time), θ1 is the
skills of the first child, and θ2 is the skills of the second child. I assume that αj > 0
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for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, which along with additively separable logarithmic specification
ensures that the utility function is strictly increasing in each of its arguments and
jointly strictly concave in all of its arguments. Without any loss of generality, I
normalize the scale of utility to 1,
∑4
j=1 αj = 1.
Skills are composed of cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions. I assume that
households preferences over the two dimensions is characterized by the following
Cobb-Douglas form. Let i ∈ {1, 2} denote the order of birth, then:
log θit+1 = α5 log k
i
t+1 + (1− α5) log nit+1 i = 1, 2 (2.2)
where k is the cognitive skills, n is the non-cognitive skills, and α5 ∈ (0, 1) is the
preference for cognitive skills. Note that α5 does not depend on i; that is, I assume
that households value the skills identically for both children. This assumption is
to reduce the number of parameters to estimate and can be relaxed at the cost of
additional computational burden.
2.2.3 Technologies
Households invest time and money in the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of
children. Investments, along with the current level of skills, produce the next level of
skills according to the technologies of skill formation. Let t1 and t2 denote the birth
periods for the first and second child. Without any loss of generality, set t1 = 1 and
let t′ = t−t2. Cognitive skills evolve according to the following piece-wise technology:
k1t+1 =

(k1t )
δ1,t (e1t )
δ2,t (a1t )
δ3,t t = 1, · · · , t2 − 1
(k1t )
δ1,t (e1t )
δ2,t (a1t )
δ3,t (st)
δ4,t t = t2, · · · ,M
k1M+1 t = M + 1, · · · , T
(2.3)
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k2t+1 =

k2t2 t = 1, · · · , t2 − 1
(k2t )
δ1,t′ (e2t )
δ2,t′ (a2t )
δ3,t′ (st)
δ4,t′ t = t2, · · · ,M
(k2t )
δ1,t′ (e2t )
δ2,t′ (a2t )
δ3,t′ t = M + 1, · · · , T
(2.4)
where e is the monetary investment, a is the alone time investment (time that is
spent with one child alone), and s is the shared time investment (time that is spent
with both children concurrently). Note that alone time investment is an imperfect
substitute for the shared time investment. This modeling choice follows the findings
in Chapter 1. δj,t, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is the elasticity of cognitive skills with respect to
input j, which depends on the child’s age, t. That is, the same level of investment
produces a different level of skill at different ages. This assumption is supported by
evidence and is widely used in the literature (Heckman and Masterov, 2007).
Similarly, non-cognitive skills evolve according to the following technology:
n1t+1 =

(n1t )
η1,t (e1t )
η2,t (a1t )
η3,t t = 1, · · · , t2 − 1
(n1t )
η1,t (e1t )
η2,t (a1t )
η3,t (st)
η4,t t = t2, · · · ,M
n1M+1 t = M + 1, · · · , T
(2.5)
n2t+1 =

n2t2 t = 1, · · · , t2 − 1
(n2t )
η1,t′ (e2t )
η2,t′ (a2t )
η3,t′ (st)
η4,t′ t = t2, · · · ,M
(n2t )
η1,t′ (e2t )
η2,t′ (a2t )
η3,t′ t = M + 1, · · · , T
(2.6)
where ηj,t, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is the elasticity of non-cognitive skills with respect to input
j at age t.
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2.2.4 Households’ Problems
Households maximize the sum of discounted utility subject to a lifetime mone-
tary budget constraint, sequence of time budget constraints, and cognitive and non-
cognitive skill formation technologies. The household’s problems in the sequence form
is:
max
{ct}Tt=1,{e1t }Mt=1,{e2t }Tt=t2
{`t}Tt=1,{a1t }Mt=1,{a2t }Tt=t2 ,{st}Mt=t2
T∑
t=1
βt−1u(ct, `t, k1t+1, n
1
t+1, k
2
t+1, n
2
t+1)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
R−(t−1)
(
ct + 1{t ≤M}e1t + 1{t ≥ t2}e2t
)
=
T∑
t=1
R−(t−1)It
`t + 1{t ≤M}a1t + 1{t ≥ t2}a2t + 1{t2 ≤ t ≤M}st = τ ∀t
(2.7)
where β is the discount factor, R is the competitive gross interest rate, I is the
household’s income, τ is the periodic time endowment, and 1{.} is the indicator
function. Note that households have perfect information about their income profile
and can fully borrow against their future income. The model abstracts from borrowing
constraints or uncertainty about future income in order to make an important first
step toward incorporating saving decisions. 1
This model has a straightforward closed-form solution which is built on four as-
sumptions: perfect information, frictionless borrowing, log preferences, and log tech-
nologies. Perfect information and frictionless borrowing imply that optimal decisions
depend on the present value of the household’s lifetime income, not on the house-
hold’s income profile. These assumptions greatly reduce the computational burden
of estimating the model. Additionally, log preferences and log technologies imply
1It is not possible to determine whether the model provides a lower or an upper bound for the
effect of household income on allocation of resources between siblings. For example, all else equal,
the allocation in the presence of borrowing constraints is a function of household’s income profile
which depending on its shape can make the allocation more or less equal relative to the allocation
under no borrowing constraints.
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that optimal decisions are interior and independent of children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive skills in all periods. These assumptions are for tractability and are sufficient
to have a closed-form solution. Even though that the model is simple, it captures im-
portant empirical patterns, specifically, the age profile of cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, time investments, and the birth order effects.
2.2.5 Optimal Decisions
Households allocate their present value of lifetime income among consumption,
monetary investments in the first child, and monetary investments in the second
child such that the allocation equates the marginal benefits across all three uses in all
periods. The log preferences together with log technologies imply that in the optimal
allocation, the ratio of any two uses is equal to the ratio of their lifetime marginal
benefits. The optimal decision for y ∈ {ct, e1t , e2t} and all t is:
y =
ϕ(y)∑T
t=1[ϕ(ct) + ϕ(e
1
t ) + ϕ(e
2
t )]
T∑
t=1
R−(t−1)It (2.8)
where ϕ(y) is the lifetime marginal benefits of choice y. Note that the lifetime
marginal benefits depend on current and future utility flows. In particular, households
take into account that consumption yields only a current utility flow while monetary
investments in children result in future utility flows as well.
ϕ(ct) = β
t−1Rt−1α1 (2.9)
ϕ(e1t ) = 1{t ≤M}βt−1Rt−1
(
α3α5δ2,t(1 + φ
1
t ) + α3(1− α5)η2,t(1 + ψ1t )
)
(2.10)
ϕ(e2t ) = 1{t ≥ t2}βt−1Rt−1
(
α4α5δ2,t′(1 + φ
2
t ) + α4(1− α5)η2,t′(1 + ψ2t )
)
(2.11)
where φit and ψ
i
t are the current value of future benefits of an additional investment in
cognitive and non-cognitive skills of child i at time t, respectively. In the estimation
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of the model, I simplify the analysis further by assuming β = R−1. This assumption
cancels R out of the optimal decisions.
φ1t = 1{t ≤M}
T∑
i=t+1
βi−t
i∏
j=t+1
δ1,j (2.12)
φ2t = 1{t2 ≤ t < T}
T∑
i=t+1
βi−t
i∏
j=t+1
δ1,j′ (2.13)
ψ1t = 1{t ≤M}
T∑
i=t+1
βi−t
i∏
j=t+1
η1,j (2.14)
ψ2t = 1{t2 ≤ t < T}
T∑
i=t+1
βi−t
i∏
j=t+1
η1,j′ (2.15)
Similarly, in each period, households allocate their time endowment among leisure,
time investment in the first child alone, time investment in the second child alone,
and time investment in both children concurrently, such that the allocation equates
lifetime marginal benefits across all four uses. The log preferences together with log
technologies imply that in the optimal allocation, the ratio of any two uses is equal to
the ratio of their lifetime marginal benefits. The optimal decision for y ∈ {`t, a1t , a2t , st}
and all t is:
y =
ϕ(y)
ϕ(`t) + ϕ(a1t ) + ϕ(a
2
t ) + ϕ(st)
τ (2.16)
where ϕ(y) is the lifetime marginal benefits of choice y:
ϕ(`t) = α2 (2.17)
ϕ(a1t ) = 1{t ≤M}
(
α3α5δ3,t(1 + φ
1
t ) + α3(1− α5)η3,t(1 + ψ1t )
)
(2.18)
ϕ(a2t ) = 1{t ≥ t2}
(
α4α5δ3,t′(1 + φ
2
t ) + α4(1− α5)η3,t′(1 + ψ2t )
)
(2.19)
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ϕ(s1t ) = 1{t2 ≤ t ≤M}
(
α3α5δ3,t(1 + φ
1
t ) + α3(1− α5)η3,t(1 + ψ1t )
)
(2.20)
ϕ(s2t ) = 1{t2 ≤ t ≤M}
(
α4α5δ3,t′(1 + φ
2
t ) + α4(1− α5)η3,t′(1 + ψ2t )
)
(2.21)
ϕ(st) = ϕ(s
1
t ) + ϕ(s
2
t ) (2.22)
Note that time (monetary) investment, among other things, depends on the elas-
ticity of skills with respect to time (monetary) investment. For example, if the elastic-
ity of skills with respect to time (monetary) investment is high early in development
and low late in development, then, all else equal, the household optimally invests
more during the early years of development relative to the late years.
2.2.6 Discussion
It is constructive to describe the components of the model that differentially affect
the skills of the two children. Let Ki and N i denote the cognitive and non-cognitive
skills of child with birth order of i ∈ {1, 2} at the end of development. Then, the
birth order effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills are:
K2 −K1 = ∆K
(
{αj}j∈{1,2,3,4,5}, {{δj,t, ηj,t}Tt=1}j∈{1,2,3,4},
∑
R−(t−1)It
)
(2.23)
N2 −N1 = ∆N
(
{αj}j∈{1,2,3,4,5}, {{δj,t, ηj,t}Tt=1}j∈{1,2,3,4},
∑
R−(t−1)It
)
(2.24)
The first component is preferences. The household may have unequal preferences
for the first and second child’s skills. Then, all else equal, differences in preference
weights will result in differences in investment and therefore, differences in skills
between children.
The second component is elasticities. The cognitive and non-cognitive technologies
are asymmetric for the two children. Skills of the first child evolve according to
one-child technologies until the second child arrives. At this point, skills of both
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children evolve according to two-child technologies until the first child’s development
ends. Then, skills of the second child evolve according to one-child technologies. The
elasticities of one-child technologies may be different from the elasticities of two-child
technologies. Then, all else equal, identical investments would produce differences in
skills.
The third component is time constraints. Time constraints can cause differences in
investments over the development years which would, all else equal, cause differential
skills in the children. This is because time is a resource that cannot be saved or
borrowed. The first child enjoys the undivided attention of the household early in
development while the second child has the same opportunity late in development.
The last component is income endowments. Income is the only source of hetero-
geneity in the model, which can either alleviate or exacerbate the birth order effects
depending on the preferences and the technologies. Given that the household can save
or borrow without friction, then, all else equal, the concavity of the preferences and
the technologies imply that a higher household income results in smaller differences
in skills between children.
2.3 Estimation
In this section, I discuss details of the assumptions regarding the identification
and the estimation of the model. The estimator is based on the Method of Moments.
Supplementary Monte Carlo experiments are included in Appendix B.3, which check
the validity of the estimator.
2.3.1 Measurements
Available information in the PSID-CDS is sufficient to identify the model given
the structure that is imposed upon it. However, the data is not perfect. In particular,
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household income is observed annually until 1997 and biennially thereafter. Cogni-
tive skills, non-cognitive skills, and time investments are observed every five years.
Monetary investments are not observed at all. Below, I describe the measurement of
skills, time investments, and household income.
The cognitive and non-cognitive skills are set to the Letter-Word identification
score and the Dependent score, respectively. Alone time investment is set to the union
of maternal alone time and paternal alone time. Similarly, shared time investment is
set to the union of maternal shared time and paternal shared time. Finally, current
value of household’s lifetime income in the initial period, i.e. first child’s birth year, is
computed based on the following algorithm. First, deflate the observed income using
CPI. Then, compute the current value of the real income in the initial period using a
gross interest rate of R = 1/β. Next, take the average as a measure of current value
of the household’s annual income and multiply it by the number of periods in the
household’s lifetime to obtain the current value of household’s lifetime income at the
initial period. This procedure is equivalent to estimating the household’s permanent
income using a family fixed effects model.
2.3.2 Estimator
The estimation strategy follows Del Boca et al. (2013, 2016). I set the number
of development periods, M , to 17, and the discount factor, β, to 0.95. There are
several functions to estimate: the utility function, the technologies of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills when one child lives in the household, and the technologies of
cognitive and non-cognitive skills when two children live in the household.
The preference parameters, {α1, α2, α3, α4, α5}, are constrained to be greater than
zero and smaller than one. 2 I use the following exponential transformations to
2The weight on cognitive skills, α5, is identified under the assumption that the technology of cog-
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impose the constraints.
αj =
exp(ωαj)
1 +
∑4
i=2 exp(ωαj)
j ∈ {2, 3, 4} (2.25)
α5 =
exp(ωα5)
1 + exp(ωα5)
(2.26)
where ω’s are parameters to be estimated. Note that α1 is determined by the nor-
malization of the scale of the utility,
∑4
j=1 αj = 1.
The cognitive technology parameters, {δ1,t, δ2,t, δ3,t, δ4,t}, and the non-cognitive
technology parameters, {η1,t, η2,t, η3,t, η4,t}, are age dependent. In other words, the
elasticity of cognitive and non-cognitive skills with respect to different inputs depends
on the child’s age. I assume that the elasticities are log-linear in child’s age in order
to economize on the number of parameters to estimate.
δj,t = exp(ωδj ,0 + ωδj ,1t) j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (2.27)
ηj,t = exp(ωηj ,0 + ωηj ,1t) j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (2.28)
where t is age of the child, and ωδj ,0 and ωδj ,1 (ωηj ,0 and ωηj ,1) are the intercept and
the slope for the age profile of log elasticity of cognitive (non-cognitive) skills with
respect to input j to be estimated.
There are 32 parameters to estimate given the assumptions: 4 parameters for
preferences, 12 parameters for technologies of cognitive and non-cognitive skills when
one child lives in the household, and 16 parameters for technologies of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills when two children live in the household. In order to simplify the
estimation, I assume that the technologies of skill formation when one child lives in
the household, meaning the periods that second child is not born yet or periods that
the first child has moved out of the household, are identical to the technologies of
nitive skills is different from the technology of non-cognitive skills. If the technologies are identical,
then all α5s are observationally equivalent.
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skill formation for households with one child. Therefore, I divide the estimation of
the model into two steps. In the first step, I use data on households with one child
and estimate the technology of cognitive and non-cognitive skills when one child lives
in the household. 3 In the second step, I take the technologies when one child lives
in the household as given, and I estimate the technologies when two children live in
the household and the preferences.
The estimator is based on the Method of Moments since the children’s skills are
observed every five years and skills between the two measurements require simulation.
The algorithm for the Method of Moments works as follows. Start with a sample of
households at time t. Then, pick an initial value for the vector of primitive parameters
of the model, ω. Next, solve the household’s problem for each of the households in the
sample. Then, use the household’s optimal decisions to simulate children’s cognitive
and non-cognitive skills from t + 1 to t + 5. Finally, compute moments from the
simulated and the actual data. The Method of Moments estimator of ω is:
ω̂ = arg min
ω
(Ω− Ω̂(ω))′W (Ω− Ω̂(ω)) (2.29)
where Ω is the vector of moments computed from the sample, Ω̂(ω) is the vector of
moments computed from the simulated data generated under the parameter vector
ω, and W is a symmetric positive-definite weighting matrix.
The moments that identify the model are the mean of cognitive scores conditional
on age and birth order, the mean of non-cognitive scores conditional on age and birth
order, the mean of alone time investments conditional on age and birth order, the
mean of shared time investments conditional on age, the covariance of household
income and cognitive scores conditional on age and birth order, and the covariance
of household income and non-cognitive scores conditional on age and birth order.
3Appendix B.2 describes the model with one child, which is analogous to the model with two
children.
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2.4 Results
This section discusses the estimates and the counterfactual experiments. The
counterfactual experiments show that income transfers reduce the birth order effects,
however, they are most effective when they target low-income households. Therefore,
the paper documents another efficiency benefit for policies that target children in
low-income households.
2.4.1 Estimates
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate the model’s fit. Figure 2.1 displays the fit for av-
erage cognitive skills, average non-cognitive skills, and average alone time investments
for the first-born children conditional on age. Figure 2.2 replicates the same moments
for the second-born children. The figures demonstrate that the model matches age-
profiles of skills and time investments well. In particular, the model is able to replicate
the increasing pattern of cognitive and non-cognitive skills and decreasing pattern of
time investments in age.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 plot the estimates of the elasticities of cognitive skills with
respect to different inputs for the first and second child, respectively, in households
with birth spacing of one year. The elasticity of cognitive skills with respect to
monetary and time investment are decreasing in age. Monetary and time investments
early in development are more productive in comparison with investments late in
development. For example, the elasticity of cognitive skills with respect to alone time
investments decreases from approximately 1 at birth to 0.1 at age sixteen for the
first child. The kinks are the result of a child entering or exiting the household. For
example, if the second child enters the household when the first child is one year old,
the elasticity of cognitive skills with respect to alone time investments drops from 1
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to 0.5 while the elasticity of cognitive skills with respect to shared time investments
rises from 0 to 0.3 for the first child.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 plot the estimates of the elasticity of non-cognitive skills
with respect to different inputs for the first and second child, respectively. The
figures demonstrate that the elasticity of non-cognitive skills with respect to monetary
investments are decreasing in age while the elasticity with respect to shared time
investments are increasing in age. Monetary investments are more productive early in
development while shared time investments are more productive late in development.
The figure also shows that the elasticity with respect to alone time investment is flat
at about zero. Comparison of cognitive and non-cognitive elasticities with respect
to alone and shared time investments demonstrates that alone time investment is
more productive to cognitive skills while shared time investment is more productive
to non-cognitive skills.
Additionally, when considering the preference parameters, the highest weight is on
leisure at 0.83, which is not surprising as it includes any time that households do not
spent with their children. Furthermore, households have a slight preference for their
second child; the weight on the second child’s skills is 0.06, while the weight on the
first child’s skills is 0.05. Even though the difference in preference weights on the two
children is negligible, the weight on the second child is 20% higher than the weight
on the first child. Note that the ratio of household investments in the two children
is a function of the ratio of children’s preference weights. Finally, with a weight on
cognitive skills equal to 0.51, households equally value cognitive and non-cognitive
skills of children. The details of the primitive parameters estimates, ω’s, are available
in Appendix B.1.
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2.4.2 Counterfactual Experiments
I use the model estimates to quantify the effect of income transfers, one of the
most popular counterfactual policy experiments in child development literature, on
the birth order effects. Figure 2.7 plots the birth order effects in units of standard
deviation at the end of development, seventeen years of age, against household in-
come. 4 The birth order effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills range from
0.61 and 0.46 of a standard deviation in households that earn 10,000 USD per year
to 0.34 and 0.11 in households that earn 100,000 USD per year. Concavity of the
technologies implies that each additional dollar increases the skills at a decreasing
rate, and the concavity of the preferences gives the household an incentive to close
the skills gap between the children as the household’s income increases.
The slope of the curve is the effect of an annual income transfer of 10,000 USD
on the birth order effects, which is decreasing in household income. The figure shows
that an increase in annual income of 10,000 USD decreases the birth order effects
in cognitive and non-cognitive skills, on average, by 0.03 and 0.04 of a standard
deviation. The gain, however, is decreasing in household income. For example, an
annual transfer of 10,000 USD to households that earn 10,000 USD per year decreases
the birth order effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills by 0.08 and 0.10 of a
standard deviation. An identical transfer to households that earn 90,000 USD per
year decrease the birth order effects in cognitive and non-cognitive skills only by 0.01
and 0.02 of a standard deviation. Therefore, the model documents another efficiency
benefit for policies that target children in low-income households.
The estimates of households preference weights demonstrated that the weight on
4The initial skills for the following counterfactual experiments are estimated at age three and are
assumed to be the same for the two children. One can estimate the initial conditions conditional on
birth order. My approach is more conservative.
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the second child’s skills is 20% higher than the preference weight on the first child’s
skills. This implies that the birth order effects are not the result of favorable prefer-
ences for the first child, rather they must be the result of the differences in cognitive
and non-cognitive elasticities, the life-cycle structure of the time constraints, or some
combination of the two. In other words, if the household have had equal preferences
for the two children, then the magnitude of the birth order effects would have been
larger. To quantify the effect of unequal preference weights on the birth order effects,
I compute the birth order effects in a counterfactual world where households have
equal preference weights for the first and second child. For this experiment, I set the
preference weights on the first and second child equal to the average of the two and
re-run the model.
Figure 2.8 plots the birth order effects in units of standard deviation at the end of
development against household income. The figure demonstrates that equal prefer-
ence weight for the two children exacerbates the birth order effects. As the weight on
the second child’s skills decreases and the weight on the first child’s skills increases,
households decrease their investments in the second child and increase their invest-
ments in the first child. This widens the skills gap between the two children. For
example, the birth order effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills in households
that earn 10,000 USD per year increases from 0.61 and 0.46 of a standard deviation,
in the baseline, to 0.99 and 0.48 of a standard deviation, in the counterfactual, re-
spectively. The effect of equal preference weights is more noticeable on cognitive skills
than non-cognitive skills, which is due to the higher elasticity of cognitive skills with
respect to investments.
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2.4.3 Discussion
In this section, I compare the gradient of the birth order effects in household’s
income between the reduced-form and the structural models. Figure 2.9 plots the
birth order effects in cognitive and non-cognitive skills by the level of household
income. The black line shows the income gradient implied by the reduced-form model,
while the gray line shows the gradient implied by the structural model. The figure
demonstrates that the income gradient implied by the structural model is steeper
than the gradient implied by the reduced-form model. This discrepancy comes from
the limitations of each model. The reduced-form model allows for heterogeneity
in multiple dimensions, but it has endogeneity problems. 5 In contrast, the
structural model addresses the endogeneity of the household’s investment choices,
but it only allows for heterogeneity in household’s income. This modeling choice
is for tractability, but if households are heterogeneous in other dimensions that are
correlated with income, then income captures their effects. For example, households
with a high income may have high ability parents. If high ability parents become more
productive after investing in their first-born child relative to low ability parents, then
their investments in the second-born child become more productive, which causes the
birth order effects to decrease in the parents ability. But if ability is not modeled,
then income captures its effects.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I demonstrate that income transfers can alleviate the birth order
effects, but their effects are heterogeneous and decreasing in household income. The
counterfactual experiment shows that an annual income transfer of 10,000 USD to
5See section 1.4.4
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low-income households decreases the birth order effects on cognitive and non-cognitive
skills by one-sixth, which is five times bigger than the effect in high-income household.
Therefore, the model demonstrates another efficiency benefit for policies that target
children in low-income households.
The model has a number of limitations. The model takes fertility as exogenous.
There is developing evidence that birth spacing between siblings affects the birth
order effects, which is an omitted variable in the model and can bias the findings.
Moreover, the model does not address the labor supply decisions, which is a potential
margin for households to save time. For example, households can choose to work
more in some periods in order to work less in other periods and spend more time with
their children. Counterfactuals that do not take labor supply decisions into account
are likely to be a lower-bound for the policy effects. Finally, the model allows for
heterogeneity only in household’s income. If households are heterogeneous in other
dimensions, then income captures their effects.
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2.6 Figures
Figure 2.1: Model Fit: Mean Conditional on Age - First Child
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
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Figure 2.2: Model Fit: Mean Conditional on Age - Second Child
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
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Figure 2.3: Estimates of Cognitive Elasticities - First Child
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: The figure pertains to households with birth spacing of one year.
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Figure 2.4: Estimates of Cognitive Elasticities - Second Child
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: The figure pertains to households with birth spacing of one year.
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Figure 2.5: Estimates of Non-Cognitive Elasticities - First Child
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: The figure pertains to households with birth spacing of one year.
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Figure 2.6: Estimates of Non-Cognitive Elasticities - Second Child
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: The figure pertains to households with birth spacing of one year.
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Figure 2.7: Birth Order Effects at Age 17
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: BOE denotes the birth order effect and is defined as the difference between
the second and the first child skills.
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Figure 2.8: Birth Order Effects at Age 17 under Equal Preference Weights
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: BOE denotes the birth order effect and is defined as the difference between
the second and the first child skills. The graph plots the BOE had the household
had the same preference weights on the first and second child.
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Figure 2.9: Birth Order Effects: Reduced-Form vs. Structural Models
Figure C-9: Birth Order Effects
(a) By Income
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Note: BOE denotes the birth order effect and is defined as the difference between
the second and the first child skills. “Data” and “Model” denote the prediction
of the reduced-form and structural models, respectively.
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Chapter 3
SCHOOLS, PARENTS, AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1
3.1 Introduction
The wide dispersion of measured human capital in children and its strong rela-
tionship with later life outcomes has prompted a renewed interest in understanding
the determinants of skill formation among children (for a recent review, see Heckman
and Mosso, 2014). Throughout their lives, children are influenced by many factors–
parents, neighborhoods, peers, and schools–and quantifying the relative importance
of the factors at various points in the development process is a central question. This
chapter develops a framework to examine the relative importance of investments at
home and at school during an important transition for many children, entering formal
schooling at kindergarten, which represents a substantial increase in interactions with
caregivers other than family members.
We synthesize two separate and parallel research programs. First, a child develop-
ment literature, which uses observational data on measures of children’s cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, assesses the importance of parental investments on the develop-
ment process (Todd and Wolpin, 2007; Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al.,
2010). This analysis is largely silent on the role of schools, and how the distribution
of school quality across children affects inequality in children’s skills. In contrast, a
distinct second literature, which uses large scale administrative data from particular
school systems, assesses the importance of schools, classrooms, and teachers (Rockoff,
2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; Aaronson et al., 2007; Jackson, 2012; Chetty et al., 2014a,b;
1WITH FRANCESCO AGOSTINELLI AND MATTHEW WISWALL.
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Fle`che, 2017). This research is mostly silent on the importance of influences outside
of school. We develop an empirical framework general enough to “nest” many of
the key features of the prior literature. Our framework allows for both classroom
and parental influences, imperfect measures of both skills and inputs, cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, and complementarities between children’s skills and investments
from home and school.
Our first empirical challenge in estimating the technology of skill formation is mea-
surement error. While measurement issues exist in many areas of empirical research,
they may be particularly salient in research about child development. There exists a
number of different measures of children’s skills, and each measure can be arbitrarily
located and scaled. 2 In the presence of these measurement issues, identification
of the underlying latent process of skill development is particularly challenging, but
nonetheless essential because ignoring the measurement issues through ad hoc sim-
plifying assumptions could severely bias our inferences. We treat both the home and
school as latent, fundamentally unobserved inputs. For the home influences, we use
a number of measures, following the dynamic latent factor structure of Cunha et al.
(2010). For the school influences, we exploit the clustering by classroom in our data,
as in much of the recent education production function literature.
Our second empirical challenge is the classic omitted variable bias. Our approach
is to use the rich nature of the data, including measures for cognitive skills, non-
cognitive skills, and parental investments, and allowing for a general classroom ef-
fect. We test this assumption using the rich set of parental characteristics that we
have available. This follows approaches such as Chetty et al. (2014a) that use in-
formation on parental income from tax records to test the validity of teacher value
2For a recent analysis of how measurement issues can be particularly salient, see Bond and Lang
(see 2013b,a) who analyze the black-white test score gap.
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added models. Although parental and household characteristics are strongly corre-
lated with outcomes, once we estimate our models, the estimates for these variables
are small. We further test the validity of our models using a number of out-of-sample
tests, exploiting extant experimental variation. We “simulate” the effects of the
Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) experiment (Krueger, 1999;
Chetty et al., 2011). The intuition for this approach is that if our estimated model
can reproduce the experimental results, it would provide a strong suggestion of our
model’s validity.
Our identification analysis builds on previous work but offers a distinct approach
to the empirical challenges. Previous approaches apply the techniques developed
for cross-sectional latent factor models (Anderson and Rubin, 1956; Jo¨reskog and
Goldberger, 1975; Goldberger, 1972; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1975; Chamberlain,
1977a,b; Carneiro et al., 2003) to the dynamic latent factor models describing the
development of children’s skills. In an influential paper applying latent factor model-
ing to child development, Cunha et al. (2010) identify the skill production technology
by first “re-normalizing” the latent skill distribution at each period, treating the
skills in each period as separate latent factors. While latent skills, which lack a
meaningful location and scale, require some normalization (say at the initial period),
repeated re-normalization every period is an unnecessary over-identifying restriction
if the production function already has a known location and scale. We show that non-
parametric identification of this class of KLS production functions is possible without
these re-normalization restrictions, and our identification approach avoids imposing
restrictions these restrictions because they can bias the estimation (Agostinelli and
Wiswall, 2016b).
We find that school investments are an important determinant of children’s skills
at the end of kindergarten, whereas home investments, although strongly correlated
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with end-of-kindergarten outcomes, have smaller effects. In addition, we document a
negative complementarity between children’s skills at kindergarten entry and invest-
ments from schools, implying that low-skill children benefit the most from an increase
in the quality of schools. The counterfactual policy experiments show that providing
all children with the 90th percentile of school investments decreases the standard
deviation of the end-of-kindergarten distribution of skills by about 0.2 of a standard
deviation, a substantial effect for one year of intervention. Moreover, it decreases the
gap between the 10th and the 90th percentile of the end-of-kindergarten distribution
of skills by 0.5 of a standard deviation.
Subsequent sections of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses
the econometric model, identification assumptions, and estimation strategy. Section
3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 reports the estimation and the counterfactual pol-
icy experiments results. Section 3.5 provides the validation and robustness exercises.
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model and Estimation Framework
3.2.1 Skill Development
At each age t = 0, 1, . . . , T children are characterized by a set of J skills. Let
θj,i,t be child i’s stock of skill j at age t. The collection of J skills for child i is
represented by the vector Θi,t = {θ1,i,t, . . . , θJ,i,t}. Skills include both “cognitive” and
“non-cognitive” skills, and can include other attributes of the child such as health or
personality traits. Skill j in the next period is produced according to this technology:
θj,i,t+1 = fj,t(Θi,t, Sj,i,t, Hj,i,t) (3.1)
where Hj,i,t is a vector of investments from “home” and Sj,i,t is a vector of investments
from the “school” the child attends. This formulation of the skill technology specifies
57
skills as a first order Markov process. The child development function (3.1) is indexed
by j and t to emphasize that the technology itself is heterogeneous across skills and
over ages.
We use the terms “home” and “school” broadly. Investment from home represents
all child development activities outside of school, and need not be from interactions
with parents, but could involve non-parental caregivers such as after school care.
Investment from school can be from any interaction during the school day, including
from teachers, other schools staff, and peers. In our empirical specifications we allow
for classroom specific investment, which can expose children within the same school
to different investments. Another key feature of our model is that investments have
both a “quality” and a “quantity” dimension. All else being equal, investment from
school increases with the time children spend in school, and investment from home
correspondingly decreases. Using child level data on time spent at school, we attempt
to ascertain how much of the heterogeneity in school investment is due to quantity of
school time relative to quality for a fixed amount of time.
In the child development literature (see perhaps Heckman and Masterov, 2007),
(3.1) is typically labeled a “child development technology”. In the education literature
(see for example Rivkin et al., 2005; Krueger, 1999), (3.1) is labeled an “education pro-
duction function”. In the former case, the skills include cognitive and non-cognitive
skills measured in survey data, and the investments from parents are the focus of the
analysis. In the latter case, skills are typically reading or mathematics skills measured
using standardized tests administered in schools, and the productivity of school in-
puts is the focus. Our specification nests both of these frameworks, and an important
emphasis of our approach is to examine the relative importance of home and school
factors on child development.
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3.2.2 Measurement
Our skill development/education production function is written in terms of latent
variables. An important empirical advance is the recognition that children’s skills
and the various investments in those skills from parents and schools are, in general,
unobserved and imperfectly measured. We consider a measurement system which
can incorporate several major approaches. We allow for multiple measures of latent
variables, and following Cunha and Heckman (2008), we conceptualize each measure
M as imperfect, with some measurement error .
Let ω be a generic latent variable. For each latent variable for a child i, say latent
skill stock in period t with ωi,t = θj,i,t, we have m = 1, 2, . . . , Kω,t measures. The
number of measures can vary across latent variables and periods, and depends on the
data available. Each scalar measure is denoted Mω,i,t,m and takes the form:
Mω,i,t,m = bω,t,m(ωi,t, ω,i,t,m) (3.2)
where ω,i,t,m is the measurement error for measure m and bω,t,m is the measurement
function.
One could take a similar approach with school inputs and assume observed class-
room characteristics, such as class size or teacher’s years of experience, are imperfect
measures of classroom quality (Bernal et al., 2016). We take a different and more
robust approach, and exploit the clustering by classrooms in our data to identify the
distribution of classroom quality and the productivity of these inputs in producing
child skills. We detail this approach below.
3.2.3 Baseline Empirical Specification
The general model presented above provides some of the general concepts of our
empirical specification. Next we present specific functional forms, identification as-
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sumptions, and estimation strategy, which we can take directly to data. We start with
a baseline specification, based on a particular specification of the production tech-
nology (3.1) and measurement system (3.2). This specification is the most restrictive
specification that we consider, and we generalize it in subsequent sections.
The baseline specification assumes a log-linear, Cobb-Douglas, form for the pro-
duction technology. We specify the skill development function for each skill j (3.1)
as
ln θj,i,t+1 = lnAj,t + γ1,j ln θj,i,t + γ2,j lnSj,i,t + ηj,i,t (3.3)
Skill j in period t + 1 is produced by the previous period stock θj,i,t and school in-
vestments Sj,i,t. The parameter γ1,j provides the relative productivity of the existing
stock of skills. γ2,j provides the productivity of school investments. ηj,i,t is a skill pro-
duction “shock,” representing all omitted inputs. lnAj,t is an intercept, representing
total factor productivity (TFP).
In the baseline framework, we assume a linear system of measures for the latent
skills stocks. For each latent variable ω and period t, we have m = 1, 2, . . . , Kω,t
measures given by
Mω,i,t,m = µω,t,m + λω,t,m lnωi,t + ω,i,t,m (3.4)
where Mω,i,t,m are the measures, ω,i,t,m are the measurement “errors”, and µω,t,m and
λω,t,m are the measurement parameters. µω,t,m and λω,t,m provide the location and
scale of the measure m. λω,t,m is often referred to as a “factor loading” for the latent
“factor” ωi,t and measure m. Given the inclusion of the intercept, we normalize the
measurement error to be mean-zero without loss of generality: E(ω,t,m) = 0 for all
ω, t,m.
For children’s skills (ωi,t = θj,i,t), the measures M are a combination of available
assessments, as discussed in more detail below. Instead of using specific measures
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of classroom quality, we treat classroom quality as a kind of “common” input ex-
perienced by all children in the classroom. This specification is more robust than
assuming particularly classroom characteristics, such as class size or teacher’s year of
experience, provide particular measures of the within school investments.
Finally, note that our baseline framework nests the standard “value added” edu-
cation production specifications. To see this, consider the special case of this model
where a given measure indexed m is assumed to measure the latent skills with no
error. This measure is typically an end-of-grade standardized test in a subject such
as mathematics or reading. In our notation, the value added specification takes the
form:
Mj,i,s,t+1,m = γ1,jMj,i,s,t,m + δj,s,t + ηj,i,s,t,m (3.5)
where δj,s,t is the common school “effect” for school s. Equation (3.5) shows that
the value added specification is a special case of our baseline specification. First, the
model in (3.5) can be easily mapped to our baseline model (3.3) as a special case
when the school investment is homogeneous among children in the same school, that
is Sj,i,t = Sj,s,t for all i in school s. In fact, in this case it is easy to show that
δj,s,t = γ2,j lnSj,s,t. Moreover, we allow for skills to be unobserved and we do not base
our empirical analysis on arbitrarily scaled test scores.
3.2.4 Identification of Baseline Specification
In this section, we describe the identification of our baseline specification. The
concepts introduced here apply to the identification of the more general models that
we explore next.
The baseline specification is identified up to some initial normalization, and it
requires several normalizations given that latent skills and school inputs are not di-
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rectly observed and have no particular location or scale. We normalize all of the
initial period (t = 0) latent variables to have mean of zero and variance of one:
Normalization 1 Initial period (t = 0) normalizations:
(i) E(lnωi,0) = 0
(ii) V (lnωi,0) = 1
for all ωi,0 ∈ {Θi,0, Sj,i,0}
With these normalization, we treat all latent variables symmetrically, imposing the
same normalizations on each in order to ease the interpretation of the estimates. One
normalization that appears non-standard relative to the prior literature is that for
the school input, which we can write as δj,s,0 ≡ γ2,j lnSj,s,0, the scale normalization
implies that V (δj,s,0) = γ2,j. That is, the variance of the school component (typically
treated as a school or classroom level fixed effect) is equal to the parameter γ2,j. We
choose this normalization so that the technology parameters in (3.3), which represent
the productivity of each factor in producing a child’s skills, can easily be compared
across the latent variables.
Given the normalizations on the location of the latent variables, the measurement
intercepts are identified from the mean of the measures:
µω,0,m = E(Mω,i,0,m) for all ωi,0 ∈ {Θi,0}. (3.6)
We cannot identify the scaling parameters for the initial period, λω,0,m, without
further restrictions on the measurement errors. We consider the following indepen-
dence assumptions, commonly used in this literature (e.g. Cunha et al., 2010), that
the measurement errors are independent of each other and of the latent variables:
Assumption 1 Measurement model assumptions:
(i) ω,i,t,m ⊥ ω,i,t,m′ for all t, m 6= m′, and latent variable ω
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(ii) ω,i,t,m ⊥ ω,i,t′,m for all t 6= t′, all m and m′, and latent variable ω
(iii) ω,i,t,m ⊥ ω′ for all t, m, and latent variable ω′
Assumption 1 (i) asserts that measurement errors are independent contemporaneously
across measures. Assumption 1 (ii) asserts that measurement errors are independent
over time. Assumption 1 (iii) asserts that measurement errors are independent of
the latent variables for child skills and investments. Although these assumptions are
strong in some sense, they are common in the current literature. 3
Under these assumptions, the initial period (t=0) scaling factors are identified
from ratio of covariances between the measures:
λω,0,m =
√
Cov(Mω,0,m,Mω,0,m′)Cov(Mω,0,m,Mω,0,m′′)
Cov(Mω,0,m′ ,Mω,0,m′′)
(3.7)
for any m 6= m′ 6= m′′. 4 Given the identification of the measurement parameters for
the initial period, we can identify the latent variables up to the measurement errors:
lnωi,0 =
Mω,i,0,m − µω,0,m
λω,0,m
+
ω,i,0,m
λω,i,0,m
= M˜ω,i,0,m +
ω,i,0,m
λω,0,m
(3.8)
where M˜ω,i,0,m is the transformed measure using the identified measurement parame-
ters. To analyze the identification of the skill development function (3.3), we substi-
tute the transformed measure (3.8) into (3.3):
ln θj,i,1 = lnAj,0 + γ1,j(M˜ω,i,0,m − j,i,0,m
λj,0,m
) + γ2,j lnSj,i,0 + ηj,i,0 (3.9)
We use a measure of the skills at t = 1 given by
ln θj,i,1 =
Mj,i,1,m − µj,1,m
λj,1,m
− j,i,1,m
λj,1,m
(3.10)
3Our assumption of full independence is sufficient, but not necessary, for at least some of our
identification analysis.
4In the presence of at least two latent skills, the identification of the measurement systems is
guaranteed with only two measures for each latent skill.
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substituting (3.10) into (3.9)
Mj,i,1,m = µj,1,m + λj,1,m lnAj,0 + λj,1,mγ1,jM˜j,i,0,m + λj,1,mγ2,j lnSj,i,0 + κj,i,0,m
(3.11)
where κj,i,0,m is given by
κj,i,0,m = λj,1,mηj,i,0 − γ1,j λj,1,m
λj,0,m
j,i,0,m + j,i,1,m (3.12)
The equation in (3.11) can be rewritten in terms of the “reduced-form“ parameters
as
Mj,i,1,m = β0,j + β1,jM˜j,i,0,m + β2,j lnSj,i,0 + κj,i,0,m (3.13)
In particular, it is easy to show that the reduced-form parameters map into the
structural parameters as
β0,j = µj,1,m + λj,1,m lnAj,0 (3.14)
β1,j = λj,1,mγ1,j (3.15)
β2,j = λj,1,mγ2,j (3.16)
The system in (3.14)-(3.16) includes 3 equations and 5 unknowns. Agostinelli and
Wiswall (2016a) show that this under-identification problem can be solved in the
presence of age-invariant measures for skills.
Definition 1 A pair of measures Mt,m and Mt+1,m is age-invariant if E(Mt,m|θt =
p) = E(Mt+1,m|θt+1 = p) for all p ∈ R++ .
Intuitively, age-invariance implies that the expectation of the measure M , e.g. a test
score, for two children with different ages but equal skills is the same, which implies
that the measurement parameters are constant with respect to a child’s age (µj,1,m
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= µj,0,m and λj,1,m = λj,0,m). We are now able to identify the structural parameters
from the reduced-form parameters as
lnAj,0 =
β0,j − µj,0,m
λj,0,m
(3.17)
γ`,j =
β`,j
λj,0,m
∀ ` ∈ {1, 2} (3.18)
where the measurement parameters for the initial period (µj,0,m, λj,0,m) are already
identified as shown in (3.6) and (3.7). Equations (3.17) and (3.18) show that in order
to consistently identify the structural parameters, we need to consistently identify
the reduced-form parameters βs.
Assumption 2 Mean-independence of the production function shock:
E(ηj,0|θj,0, Sj,0) = 0
Under Assumption 2, Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) show that the reduced-form
parameters βs are consistently identified using the multiple excluded measures as
instrumental variables to adjust for measurement error.
3.2.5 Generalizing: Parental Investments
We generalize our baseline specification in (3.3) by including parental investments.
The technology of skill formation for each type of skill j is
ln θj,i,t+1 = lnAj,t + γ1,j ln θj,i,t + γ2,j lnSj,i,t + γ3,j lnHi,t + ηj,i,t (3.19)
where Hi,t is the parental investments, and the parameter γ3,j is the productivity of
parental investments. Note that we model parental investments as a common input
among all skills, but we allow it to a have different productivity in producing each of
the skills. Similar to our treatment of the skills, we assume that parental investments
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is unobserved and imperfectly measured. Further, we assume a linear system of
measures for latent parental investments as in (3.4). We have m = 1, 2, . . . , KH,t
measures given by
MH,i,t,m = µH,t,m + λH,t,m lnHi,t + H,i,t,m (3.20)
where we maintain the assumptions on the measurement errors as in (1). Additionally,
we assume the structural shock is mean-independent of the latent factors.
Assumption 3 Mean-independence of the production function shock:
E(ηj,0|θj,0, H0, Sj,0) = 0
Following the identification discussion in section 3.2.4, we can write the technology
in (3.19) in terms of the measures as
Mj,i,1,m = µj,1,m+λj,1,m lnAj,0 + λj,1,mγ1,jM˜j,i,0,m+
λj,1,mγ2,j lnSj,i,0 + λj,1,mγ3,jM˜H,i,0,m + κj,i,0,m
(3.21)
and it can be written in the reduced-form as
Mj,i,1,m =β0,j + β1,jM˜j,i,0,m + β2,j lnSj,i,0 + β3,jM˜H,i,0,m + κj,i,0,m (3.22)
3.2.6 Generalizing: Complementarities
In this section, we generalize the technology in (3.19) to allow for complementari-
ties between investments and skills. In other words, we allow for heterogeneity in the
productivity of home and school investments with respect to initial stock of skills.
Following Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a), we consider a trans-log technology of skill
formation with interaction terms between investments and skills. The technology for
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each type of skill j is
ln θj,i,t+1 = lnAj,t + γ1,j ln θj,i,t + γ2,j lnSj,i,t + γ3,j lnHi,t+
γ4,j ln θj,i,t lnSj,i,t + γ5,j ln θj,i,t lnHi,t + γ6,j lnHi,t lnSj,i,t + ηj,i,t
(3.23)
where the parameter γ4,j governs the complementarity between school investments
and skills, γ5,j governs the complementarity between home investments and skills, and
γ6,j governs the complementarity between home investments and school investments.
Note that the elasticity of each input depends on the level of other inputs. For
example, the elasticity of skill j with respect to school investments is
∂ ln θj,i,t+1
∂ lnSj,i,t
= γ2,j + γ4,j ln θj,i,t + γ6,j lnHi,t (3.24)
γ4,j > 0 implies a higher return to school investment for children with high initial skills
relative to children with low initial skills, emphasizes the importance of investments
prior to time t (dynamic complementarity), and supports policies that target resources
to children with high initial skills.. In contrast, γ4,j < 0 implies a higher return to
school investment for children with low initial skill relative to children with high initial
skill and supports policies that target resources to children with low initial skills.
Following the identification discussion in section 3.2.4, we can write the technology
in (3.23) in terms of the measures as
Mj,i,1,m =µj,1,m + λj,1,m lnAj,0 + λj,1,mγ1,jM˜j,i,0,m + λj,1,mγ2,j lnSj,i,0+
λj,1,mγ3,jM˜H,i,0,m + λj,1,mγ4,jM˜j,i,0,m lnSj,i,0+
λj,1,mγ5,jM˜j,i,0,mM˜H,i,0,m + λj,1,mγ6,jM˜H,i,0,m lnSj,i,0 + κj,i,0,m
(3.25)
and it can be written in the reduced-form as
Mj,i,1,m = β0,j + β1,jM˜j,i,0,m + β2,j lnSj,i,0 + β3,jM˜H,i,0,m+
β4,jM˜j,i,0,m lnSj,i,0 + β5,jM˜j,i,0,mM˜H,i,0,m + β6,jM˜H,i,0,m lnSj,i,0 + κj,i,0,m
(3.26)
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3.2.7 Generalizing: Other Skills
We complete our model by including all the J skills in the technology of skill
formation for each type of skill j. Further, we allow for complementarities between
investments and all the J skills. The technology for skill j is
lnθj,i,t+1 = lnAj,t +
J∑
k=1
γ1,j,k ln θk,i,t + γ2,j lnSj,i,t + γ3,j lnHi,t+
J∑
k=1
γ4,j,k ln θk,i,t lnSj,i,t +
J∑
k=1
γ5,j,k ln θk,i,t lnHi,t + γ6,j lnHi,t lnSj,i,t + ηj,i,t
(3.27)
The empirical model for the technology in (3.27) is constructed by substituting
the transformed measures M˜ for each of the corresponding latent factors.
3.2.8 School/Classroom Decomposition
We exploit the clustering by classroom in our data to identify the distribution of
school investments. We treat school investments as a common input experienced by all
children in the same classroom. For schools in which we observe multiple classrooms,
the school investment factor can be decomposed into school- and classroom-specific
effects:
lnSj,i,0 = ln δj,s,0 + ln δj,c,0 (3.28)
where δj,s,0 and δj,c,0 represent the school and classroom effects, respectively. These
two effects are separately identified up to an additional normalization: classroom
effects are mean-zero within each school, E [δj,c,0|s] = 0. In the case of schools where
we observe only one classroom, the two effects are not separately identified, but we
are still able to identify the combined effect, Sj,i,0.
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3.2.9 Estimation
In this section, we provide an algorithm for estimating the technologies. We
demonstrate our algorithm using the technology with parental investments and com-
plementarities in (3.26). The algorithm for estimating other technologies includes the
same steps. We follow Arcidiacono et al. (2012) which develops an iterative algorithm
for estimating models that include interactions with fixed effects. Within this frame-
work, we allow for skills and parental investments to be unobserved and imperfectly
measured. We adjust for measurement errors by using multiple excluded measures as
instrumental variables as in Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a). Supplementary Monte
Carlo experiments are available in Appendix C.1.
• Step 1: Start with an initial guess for the parameters, βˆ0j = [βˆ00,j, βˆ01,j, · · · , βˆ06,j].
• Step 2: Conditional on βˆhj , h ∈ {0, 1, ...}, estimate the school/classroom fixed
effect for each school/classroom s:
l̂nSj,i,0 =
∑
i∈s
[
Mj,i,1,m − βh0,j − βh1,jM˜j,i,0,m − βh3,jM˜H,i,0,m − βh5,jM˜j,i,0,mM˜H,i,0,m
]
∑
i∈s
[
βh2,j + β
h
4,jM˜j,i,0,m + β
h
6,jM˜H,i,0,m
]
• Step 3: Conditional on l̂nSj,i,0, estimate βˆh+1j using the equation in (3.26) and
Two-Stage Least Squares estimator.
• Step 4: If || βˆhj −βˆhj
βˆh−1j
||∞ < 0.01, stop. Otherwise, return to Step 2.
3.3 Data
The data is from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Class
of 1998-99 (ECLS). The ECLS covers a nationally representative cohort of children
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from kindergarten through eighth grade. Importantly for our analysis, ECLS collects
information from a number of students at each school, covering multiple classrooms
and including multiple children in each classroom. The ECLS links each student to
their classroom, their sampled classmates within that classroom, and the classroom
teacher. Moreover, the ECLS has extensive information on home investments and
child outcomes.
3.3.1 Sample
We focus on the Fall and Spring of the kindergarten year. We include all class-
rooms that have at least five children with two mathematics, two reading, and two
non-cognitive assessments at the beginning and at the end of the kindergarten year.
Further, we require these children to have two measures of home investment during the
kindergarten year. Applying these criteria result in 9,474 children within 1,211 class-
rooms from 668 schools. Our sample of children with complete information is more
socio-economically advantaged relative to the full ECLS sample. This is indicated
by the higher household income in our sample, which is about $68,700 compared to
$62,300 in the full sample. Appendix C.2 provides the detail of the sample selection.
Table 3.1 presents detailed descriptive statistics for our sample at the time of entry
into kindergarten. The average age of children at entry is 5.68 years. Sixty-seven
percent of the children are white non-Hispanic, 14 percent are black non-Hispanic, 10
percent are Hispanic, and 9 percent are of an other race/ethnicity. Sixty-eight percent
of the children are living with both biological parents. Their mothers are on average
34 years old, have an average of 13.8 years of schooling, and work an average of 26.1
hours per week. Examining the kindergarten classrooms and schools, the average
class size is about 20 students. Some of the kindergarten classes are half-day, and
others full-day. This implies that the average instructional time across all classrooms
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is 24 hours per week, lower than for later grades. Because these are kindergarten
classrooms the teachers are overwhelmingly female. The teachers have an average of
9.6 years of experience in teaching kindergarten. Moreover, 36 percent of them have
at least a master’s degree. Finally, about 30 percent of the schools in the sample are
non-public schools, including secular and religious private schools. We return to how
these characteristics relate to classroom and school quality in later sections.
3.3.2 Child Development during Kindergarten
We briefly motivate our analysis by analyzing patterns in child development dur-
ing the kindergarten period. Figure 3.1 displays the average scores on mathemat-
ics, reading, and non-cognitive assessments at the beginning and at the end of the
kindergarten year by the level of child’s household income. Each score is normalized
using its respective mean and standard deviation at kindergarten entry to facilitate
interpretation. Figure 3.1 reveals the wide dispersion of mathematics, reading, and
non-cognitive scores at kindergarten entry across income deciles. At the time of entry,
the gap between the average mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive scores among
children at the lowest and the highest income deciles is 1.1, 1.0, and 0.5 of a standard
deviation, respectively. Figure 3.2 plots the change in average scores between the
beginning and the end of the kindergarten year. The figure indicates that by the
end of kindergarten, the dispersion of average mathematics and non-cognitive scores
widens by 0.1 of a standard deviation, while the dispersion of reading scores remains
unchanged. Specifically, the gap in average mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive
scores at the end of the kindergarten are 1.2, 1.0, and 0.6 of a standard deviation,
respectively.
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3.4 Estimates
3.4.1 Measurement Parameters
Table 3.3 presents the estimates of the measurement parameters for mathematics,
reading, and non-cognitive skills and home investments. The location of a measure is
the expected value of the measure at the average value of the latent. The scale of a
measure is the effect of one standard deviation increase in the latent on the measure.
The signal-to-noise ratio of a measure is the fraction of the variance of the measure
that is explained by the latent. Note that a higher signal-to-noise ratio indicates
that the measure is more informative about the latent. The table shows that the
signal-to-noise ratios are high, particularly for mathematics and reading skills.
3.4.2 Production Technology
Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the baseline technology. The table demon-
strates that all three skills are important in the production of each of the skills.
In addition, the table shows that self-elasticities are considerably higher than cross-
elasticities. For example, the elasticity of end-of-kindergarten reading skills with
respect to initial reading skills is 0.543, while elasticities with respect to initial math-
ematics and initial non-cognitive skills are 0.225 and 0.073, respectively. Furthermore,
the table demonstrates that school investments have a sizeable effect on each of the
skills. The elasticity of end-of-kindergarten mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive
skills with respect to school investments are 0.323, 0.387, and 0.517, respectively.
These are sizeable effects. In particular, they are 0.4, 0.7, and 0.7 times the mathe-
matics, reading, and non-cognitive self-elasticities.
Table 3.5 reports the estimates of the baseline technology including parental in-
vestments. The table shows that including parental investments in the technology has
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negligible effects on the baseline skill formation estimates. For example, the elasticity
of end-of-kindergarten non-cognitive skills with respect to initial non-cognitive skills
changes from 0.764 to 0.762, with respect to initial mathematics skills remains un-
changed at 0.142, with respect to initial reading skills changes from 0.032 to 0.022, and
with respect to school investments changes from 0.517 to 0.518. Moreover, the effects
of parental investments on skills are small. The elasticities of end-of-kindergarten
mathematics, reading and non-cognitive skills with respect to parental investments
are -0.040, 0.044, and 0.047, respectively, which are only one-tenth of the elasticities
with respect to school investments. 5
Table 3.6 presents the estimates of the value added technology (the baseline tech-
nology without the non-cognitive skills). The table demonstrates that failing to
include the non-cognitive skills in the technology upwardly biases self- and cross-
elasticities of the end-of-kindergarten mathematics and reading skills. After includ-
ing the non-cognitive skills in the technology, the elasticity of the end-of-kindergarten
mathematics skills with respect to initial mathematics skills decreases by 5%, from
0.796 to 0.759, and with respect to initial reading skills decreases by 23%, from 0.074
to 0.057.
3.4.3 Complementarity
In this section, we present the estimates for the models including complementari-
ties. Table 3.7 shows the estimates for the baseline model. 6 The table documents
a negative complementarity between initial skills and school investments. This im-
plies that school investments are more productive for children with low initial skills
5Appendix C.3 demonstrates that measures of home investment are highly correlated with end-
of-kindergarten skills, but, once we control for children’s initial skills, their correlation with end-of-
kindergarten skills goes to zero.
6Estimates for the baseline model including parental investments and the value-added model are
available in Appendix C.4.
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relative to children with high initial skills, and supports policies that target resources
to disadvantaged children.
Figure 3.3 displays the implied elasticities of school investments against the deciles
of child’s initial skills. 7 The figure demonstrates that the elasticities of school in-
vestments are decreasing in the child’s skills at kindergarten entry. For example, a 1%
increase in school investments increases the end-of-kindergarten mathematics, read-
ing, and non-cognitive skills of a child in the lowest decile of initial mathematics skills
(the lowest decile of initial reading skills) [the lowest decile of initial non-cognitive
skills] by 0.39, 0.46, and 0.59 percent (0.40, 0.50, and 0.59 percent) [0.33, 0.41, and
0.59 percent], respectively. Alternatively, the same increase in the school investments
increases skills of a child in the highest decile of initial mathematics skills (the highest
decile of initial reading skills) [the highest decile of initial non-cognitive skills] by only
0.20, 0.25, and 0.41 percent (0.18, 0.19, and 0.41 percent) [0.31, 0.37, and 0.45 per-
cent], respectively. In other words, the effect of the 1% increase in school investments
on end-of-kindergarten mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills for children in
the lowest decile of initial mathematics skills (the lowest decile of initial reading) [the
lowest decile of initial non-cognitive] are 2.0, 1.8, and 1.4 (2.2, 2.6, and 1.4) [1.1, 1.2,
and 1.3] times larger than the effect on children in the highest decile.
Figure 3.4 displays the elasticities of school investments against deciles of child’s
household income for the baseline model, the baseline model including parental invest-
ments, and the value added model. The figure demonstrates that including parental
investments in the baseline model have negligible effects on the elasticities of school
investments. In addition, the figure shows that failing to include non-cognitive skills
in the technology upwardly biases the elasticities of school investments. Moreover, the
7Appendix C.5 provides descriptive statistics for the elasticities of skills with respect to different
inputs.
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figure demonstrates that the elasticities of school investments are decreasing in the
child’s household income. For example, 1 percent increase in school investments in-
creases end-of-kindergarten mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills of a child
in the lowest decile of household income by 0.36, 043, and 0.55 percent, respectively,
whereas the same increase in the school investments increases skills of a child in the
highest decile of household income by 0.28, 0.34, and 0.48 percent, respectively. This
implies that the elasticities of school investments for children in low-income house-
holds are 1.3, 1.3, 1.1 times larger than the elasticities for children in high-income
households.
3.4.4 Classroom Sorting
Table 3.8 presents the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of initial skills
and school investments. Since the standard deviation of all inputs are normalized to
one, covariances are equal to correlations. The table shows that all three of the initial
skills are positively correlated. The correlation between mathematics and reading
skills is particularly high and equal to 0.70. The table also demonstrates that school
investments in mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills are positively corre-
lated with each other. In particular, the correlation between school investments in
mathematics and reading skills is 0.45, and is considerably higher than the corre-
lation between other school investments. Note that the correlation between school
investments are relatively small – smaller than correlation between skills.
Figure 3.5 plots the average school investments in mathematics, reading, and
non-cognitive skills by the level of child’s household income. The figure demonstrates
that school investments in mathematics and reading skills have a positive gradient in
household income, while school investments in non-cognitive skills does not have a
gradient in household income. The gap in average school investments in mathematics
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and reading skills between children at the lowest and the highest income decile is 0.38
and 0.24 of a standard deviation, respectively, while the corresponding gap in the
average school investments in non-cognitive skills is only 0.05 of a standard deviation.
3.4.5 Decomposing Child Skill Development
In this section, we examine the effects of an exogenous change in the level of
school investments on the distribution of end-of-kindergarten mathematics, reading,
and non-cognitive skills. We quantify by how much providing children with higher
levels of school investments reduces the inequality among them at the end of the
kindergarten year. We run three experiments. In the first experiment, we provide all
children with the average school investments. In this experiment, children in lower
than the average schools get higher quality schools while children in higher than
the average schools get lower quality schools. In the second experiment, we provide
the average school investments to all children in lower than the average schools.
In the final experiment, we provide all children with the 90th percentile of school
investments.
Table 3.9 presents the results of these experiments. The first experiment shows
that providing all children with the average school investments decreases the standard
deviation of the end-of-kindergarten distribution of mathematics, reading, and non-
cognitive skills by 0.09, 0.13, and 0.09 of a standard deviation, respectively. These
are equal to 9%, 14%, and 9% reduction in inequality relative to the baseline, which
are substantial effects for one year of intervention. This experiment also decreases the
gap between the 10th and 90th percentile of the end-of-kindergarten distribution of
mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills by 0.22, 0.33, and 0.24 of a standard
deviation, respectively. The second experiment demonstrates that the reduction in
inequality is not because of the losses made by children in higher than the average
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quality schools, rather because of the gains made by children in lower than the average
quality schools. For example, providing average school investments only to children in
lower than the average schools decreases the standard deviation (the gap between the
10th and the 90th percentile) of the end-of-kindergarten distribution of mathematics,
reading, and non-cognitive skills by 0.08, 0.11, and 0.08 (0.19, 0.28, and 0.23) of a
standard deviation, respectively. The third experiment demonstrates that providing
all children with the 90th percentile of school investments decreases the standard
deviation of the end-of-kindergarten distribution of mathematics, reading, and non-
cognitive skills by 0.16, 0.23, and 0.15 of a standard deviation, respectively. These
are equal to 17%, 26%, and 16% reduction in inequality relative to the baseline. This
experiment also decreases the gap between the 10th and the 90th percentile of the
end-of-kindergarten distribution of mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills by
0.40, 0.59, and 0.41 of a standard deviation, respectively.
3.5 Validation and Robustness Exercises
3.5.1 Long-Term Effects
In this section, we examine the long-term effects of our estimated school invest-
ments during kindergarten. In particular, we examine the effects of school investments
during kindergarten on mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive scores in the Spring
of first, third, fifth, and eighth grades. Table 3.10 presents the effect of investments
during the kindergarten year on future mathematics scores. The dependent and in-
dependent variables are rescaled by their respective standard deviations to facilitate
interpretation of units. The table shows that one standard deviation increase in
school investments in mathematics skills during the kindergarten year is associated
with 0.15, 0.13, 0.12, and 0.08 of a standard deviation increase in mathematics score
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at the end of the first, third, fifth, and eighth grades, respectively. In addition, the
table demonstrates that school investments in reading skills during the kindergarten
year is not associated with an increase in mathematics score in future grades. In
contrast, one standard deviation increase in school investments in non-cognitive skills
during the kindergarten year is associated with 0.03, 0.05, 0.05, and 0.06 of a stan-
dard deviation increase in mathematics score at the end of the first, third, fifth, and
eighth grades, respectively. Notice that the effects of school investments in mathe-
matics skills during the kindergarten year decreases over the grades while the effects
of school investments in non-cognitive skills increases over the grades. In addition, the
effects of school investments during kindergarten are large. For example, one standard
deviation increase in school investments in mathematics skills during kindergarten is
associated with 0.08 of a standard deviation increase in mathematics score at the
end of eighth grade, which is one-fifth of the effect of one standard deviation increase
in mathematics score at the kindergarten entry. Appendix C.6 documents similar
patterns for the effect of our estimated school investments during kindergarten on
reading and non-cognitive scores in future grades.
3.5.2 Proxies for Unobservables
One of our main concerns is that unobservable components to skill development are
correlated with school quality. We consider using a proxy for these unobservables that
is derived from household characteristics. We include previously omitted observable
characteristics in the technology of skills formation, such as child’s household income,
and examine their effects on the estimates. This is similar to Chetty et al. (2014a)
that uses parental characteristics derived from matched federal tax data to ascertain
whether teacher value added estimated using administrative records from a large
school district are correlated with unobservables.
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Table 3.11 presents the results for the baseline model. The table demonstrates
that the effects of household income is small. For example, a 100,000 USD increase
in household income (an increase of 2.2 standard deviations) is associated with only
0.08, 0.04, and 0.08 of a standard deviation increase in mathematics, reading, and
non-cognitive skills at the end of kindergarten. Comparison between the estimates in
Table 3.11 and the estimates for the baseline model in Table 3.4 shows that including
a child’s household income in the technology of skill formation has negligible effects
on the elasticities of other inputs. For example, the elasticity of end-of-kindergarten
mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills with respect to initial skills changes by
less than 3%, and with respect to school investments changes by less than 1%. Table
3.12 shows the effect of household income on skills in more general models. Panel
A demonstrates that household income is highly correlated with end-of-kindergarten
skills, but as we generalize the technology of skill formation and include initial skills
(Panel B), school investments (Panel C), parental investments (Panel D), and comple-
mentarities (Panel E), their correlation with end-of-kindergarten skills goes to zero.
3.5.3 Replication of Tennessee STAR
In this section, we replicate the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio
(STAR) experiment using our model to compare the average treatment effects from
our model with the experimental results from the STAR. The STAR was a four-year
longitudinal class-size study in which over 11,000 students and their teachers from
79 schools were randomly assigned into one of three interventions: small class (13 to
17 students per teacher), regular class (22 to 25 students per teacher), and regular-
with-aide class (22 to 25 students with a full-time teacher’s aide). The interventions
were initiated as the students entered kindergarten in the 1985-1986 school year and
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continued through third grade. 8
We replicate the STAR by estimating a counterfactual using the ECLS. In par-
ticular, we change the class size to 15 students and estimate the average treatment
effect on children’s end-of-kindergarten skills using our estimated model. There are
two challenges in replicating the STAR. First, we need an estimate for the effect of
class size on school investments. We regress our estimated school investments on the
observable characteristics of the schools to obtain an estimate for the effect of class
size. Second, we need a metric that is comparable across the different assessments
available in the two datasets. In particular, considering the measurement equation in
(3.4), we see that children’s skills map into test scores as
MECLSj,i,t,m = µ
ECLS
j,t,m + λ
ECLS
j,t,m ln θj,i,t + 
ECLS
j,i,t,m (3.29)
MSTARj,i,t,m′ = µ
STAR
j,t,m′ + λ
STAR
j,t,m′ ln θj,i,t + 
STAR
j,i,t,m′ (3.30)
where the location and the scale of the ECLS and STAR test scores can be different
from each other. The average treatment effect of the STAR on the test scores is the
expected difference in test scores between the treatment group (τ=1) and the control
group (τ=0), which maps into the average treatment effect in skills as
E
[
TESTAR
]
= E
[
MSTARj,i,1,m′ |τ = 1
]− E [MSTARj,i,1,m′ |τ = 0]
= λSTARj,1,m′
(
E [ln θj,i,1|τ = 1]− E [ln θj,i,1|τ = 0]
) (3.31)
Note that the treatment effect depends on the scale of the test score, λSTARj,t,m′ ,
which creates a problem when comparing the findings from the STAR experiment
with the estimated counterfactuals from the ECLS. However, the relative average
treatment effect between two subpopulations is free from the loading factor and can
be compared between the two datasets. To see this, consider the binary variable X,
8See Krueger (1999) for a comprehensive summary of the experiment.
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which takes a value of 1, for example, if the child qualifies for free or reduced-priced
lunch, and 0 otherwise. We define the relative average treatment effect for these two
subpopulations as
E
[
TESTAR|X = 1]
E [TESTAR|X = 0] =
E
[
MSTARj,i,1,m′|X = 1, τ = 1
]− E [MSTARj,i,1,m′ |X = 1, τ = 0]
E
[
MSTARj,i,1,m′|X = 0, τ = 1
]− E [MSTARj,i,1,m′ |X = 0, τ = 0]
=
E [ln θj,i,1|X = 1, τ = 1]− E [ln θj,i,1|X = 1, τ = 0]
E [ln θj,i,1|X = 0, τ = 1]− E [ln θj,i,1|X = 0, τ = 0] (3.32)
which is independent of the loading factor. Notice that if the average treatment effect
in subpopulation 1 is equal to (greater than) [smaller than] the average treatment
effect in subpopulation 0, then the relative average treatment effect is equal to (greater
than) [smaller than] 1.
We estimate the relative average treatment effect on children’s end-of-kindergarten
skills using our estimated model as
E
[
TEECLS|X = 1]
E [TEECLS|X = 0] =
E [ln θj,i,1|X = 1, τ = 1]− E [ln θj,i,1|X = 1, τ = 0]
E [ln θj,i,1|X = 0, τ = 1]− E [ln θj,i,1|X = 0, τ = 0] (3.33)
where the average treatment effect for each subpopulation is given by
E[TEECLS|X] = γ2,j
(
E [lnSj,i,0|X, τ = 1]− E [lnSj,i,0|X, τ = 0]
)
(3.34)
+
J∑
k=1
γ4,j,k
(
E
[
M˜k,i,0,m lnSj,i,0|X, τ = 1
]
− E
[
M˜k,i,0,m lnSj,i,0|X, τ = 0
])
+ γ6,j
(
E
[
M˜H,i,0,m lnSj,i,0|X, τ = 1
]
− E
[
M˜H,i,0,m lnSj,i,0|X, τ = 0
])
We compare the relative average treatment effect from the STAR in (3.32) with
the ECLS in (3.33). The emphasis is on whether the relative average treatment effect
from both the STAR and the ECLS are on the same side of 1. 9
Table 3.13 demonstrates that reducing class size by one student is associated with
0.014 of a standard deviation increase in school investments in both mathematics
9Note that the STAR provides the total effect of an exogenous change in the class size, while the
model provides the partial effect of change in class size (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003).
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and reading skills. Interestingly, the effect of reducing class size by one student is
about the same as effect of increasing instructional time by one hour per week for
school investments in mathematics and two hours per week for school investments
in reading. Table 3.14 reports the relative average treatment effects estimated using
the ECLS and the STAR. The top panel displays the results for the subpopulation of
children that qualify for free or reduced-priced lunch and children who do not. The
bottom panel displays the results for subpopulations of white and non-white children.
The top panel demonstrates that the relative average treatment effect on math and
reading skills for children who qualify for free or reduced-priced lunch to children who
do not in the STAR are 1.18 and 1.58, respectively, while the corresponding estimates
from the model are 1.35 and 1.33. The bottom panel shows that the relative average
treatment effect on math and reading skills for non-white to white children in the
STAR are 1.19 and 1.99, respectively, while the corresponding estimates from the
model are 1.44 and 1.41.
3.6 Conclusion
We develop an empirical framework that is general enough to nest many of the key
features of two previously separate and parallel research programs, the Child Devel-
opment literature and the Education Production Function literature. Our framework
allows for both classroom and parental in influences, imperfect measures of both skills
and investments, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and complementarities between
children’s skills and investments from home and school. We find that investment from
schools are an important determinant of children’s skills at the end of kindergarten,
whereas parental investments, although strongly correlated with end-of-kindergarten
outcomes, have smaller effects. In addition, we document a negative complemen-
tarity between children’s skills at kindergarten entry and investments from schools,
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implying that low-skill children benefit the most from an increase in the quality of
schools. The counterfactual policy experiments show that providing all children with
the 90th percentile of school investments decreases the standard deviation of the
end-of-kindergarten distribution of skills by about 0.2 of a standard deviation, and
decreases the gap between the 10th and the 90th percentile of the end-of-kindergarten
distribution of skills by 0.5 of a standard deviation.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Cognitive and Non-cognitive Scores Over Income Deciles
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
st
d.
de
v.
Math
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles of Household Income
0
1
2
Reading
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles of Household Income
0.0
0.5
st
d.
de
v.
Non-Cognitive
Beginning of Kindergarten
End of Kindergarten
Source: the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Class of 1998-99.
Notes: The Math and Reading scores are raw. The non-cognitive score is the ap-
proaches to learning evaluated by the teacher. The scores are standardized using the
mean and the standard deviation of scores at k-entry. (Let Mi,t denote a score for
child i in round t = 0, 1 (0 is entry, 1 is exit). Then, the child’s standardized score is
Mˆi,t = (Mi,t − µ0)/σ0, where µ0 is the estimated sample mean at k-entry, and σ0 is
the estimated standard deviation at k-entry).
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Figure 3.2: Change in Cognitive and Non-cognitive Scores During K
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Source: the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Class of 1998-99.
Notes: The Math and Reading scores are raw. The non-cognitive score is the ap-
proaches to learning evaluated by the teacher. The scores are standardized using the
mean and the standard deviation of scores at k-entry. (Let Mi,t denote a score for
child i in round t = 0, 1 (0 is entry, 1 is exit). Then, the child’s standardized score is
Mˆi,t = (Mi,t − µ0)/σ0, where µ0 is the estimated sample mean at k-entry, and σ0 is
the estimated standard deviation at k-entry). The change is the difference between
k-exit and k-entry standardized scores (Mˆi,1 − Mˆi,0).
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Figure 3.3: Elasticities of Investments from School
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Note: Results pertain to the baseline model with complementarities (see Table 3.7).
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Figure 3.4: Elasticities of Investments from School Against Household Income
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Note: Results pertain to the models with complementarities (see Tables 3.7, C.4, and
C.5).
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Figure 3.5: School/Classroom Sorting: Estimated Investments
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Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: School Investments pertain to the model with parental investments and com-
plementarities (see Table C.4).
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics at Kindergarten Entry
Mean Std. Dev.
A: Characteristics of Children (N=9474)
Age 5.68 0.36
Fraction male 0.51
Fraction White, Non-Hispanic 0.67
Fraction Black, Non-Hispanic 0.14
Fraction Hispanic 0.10
Fraction living with both biological parents 0.68
Mother’s age 33.81 6.41
Mother’s years of schooling 13.83 2.24
Mother’s hours worked 26.08 19.12
Household income (10,000 2005USD) 6.87 4.47
B: Characteristics of Classrooms (N=1211)
Class size 20.11 4.60
Instructional time (hours/week) 24.18 9.25
Teacher’s years of experience teaching K 9.57 7.82
Fraction of teachers having at least a master’s degree 0.36
C: Characteristics of Schools (N=668)
Fraction public school 0.70
Fraction of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch 0.27 0.27
Source: the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS).
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Table 3.2: Children Scores and Home Investments at K-Entry
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A: Mathematics Skills
math; raw 9,474 5.06 2.95 0 16
math; i.r.t. 9,474 27.43 9.24 10.5 96.0
B: Reading Skills
reading; raw 9,474 6.18 3.96 0 20
reading; i.r.t. 9,474 36.11 10.39 21.5 138.5
C: Non-cognitive Skills
approaches to learning 9,474 3.03 0.66 1 4
self-control 9,474 3.10 0.61 1 4
interpersonal skills 9,226 3.01 0.63 1 4
D: Home Investments
reading to the child 9,474 5.16 2.02 0 7
child reading picture book 9,474 5.30 2.06 0 7
child reading 9,474 4.35 2.35 0 7
Source: the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS).
Notes: The math and reading raw scores are a count of the number of items a child answers cor-
rectly on the routing test. The math and reading IRT score are an estimate of the number of
items that the child answers correctly if she takes all of the questions on all forms. Non-cognitive
scores are rated by the teacher on a scale of 1 to 4: 1=Never, 2=Sometimes, 3=Often, 4=Very
Often. Home investments are the frequency of an activity during a representative week: 0=Never,
1.5=Once or Twice per Week, 4.5=Three to Six Times per Week, 7=Every Day.
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Table 3.3: Measurement Parameters Estimates at K-Entry
Measure
Latent Parameter 1 2 3
Mathematics location 5.06 27.43
scale 2.85 8.86
signal to noise ratio 0.93 0.92
Reading location 6.18 36.11
scale 3.93 9.48
signal to noise ratio 0.98 0.83
Non-Cognitive location 3.03 3.10 3.01
scale 0.50 0.53 0.56
signal to noise ratio 0.58 0.76 0.81
Home Investments location 5.30 5.16 4.35
scale 1.61 1.02 1.24
signal to noise ratio 0.61 0.25 0.28
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: The estimates pertain to the initial period (t = 0). For each measure m of latent
ω at time t, the location is µω,t,m, the scale is λω,t,m, and the signal-to-noise ratio is 1 −
var(ω,t,m)/var(Mω,t,m). See the measurement equation 3.4 for more details.
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Table 3.4: Baseline Skill Formation Estimates
logM1 logR1 logN1
logM0 0.759*** 0.225*** 0.142***
[0.732,0.782] [0.197,0.253] [0.111,0.174]
logR0 0.057*** 0.543*** 0.032**
[0.028,0.083] [0.515,0.566] [0.003,0.060]
logN0 0.080*** 0.073*** 0.764***
[0.060,0.102] [0.048,0.098] [0.732,0.797]
logS0 0.323*** 0.387*** 0.517***
[0.307,0.339] [0.370,0.408] [0.491,0.555]
N-Children 9474 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-cognitive
skills, and school investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 represent the begin-
ning and the end of the kindergarten year. All models control for age, age squared,
and the number of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Bootstrapped
classroom-clustered 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote
significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Baseline Skill Formation Estimates w. Parental Investments
logM1 logR1 logN1
logM0 0.752*** 0.222*** 0.142***
[0.726,0.778] [0.195,0.250] [0.108,0.175]
logR0 0.059*** 0.532*** 0.022
[0.030,0.085] [0.506,0.555] [-0.007,0.055]
logN0 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.762***
[0.062,0.103] [0.046,0.096] [0.733,0.795]
logH0 -0.040*** 0.044*** 0.047***
[-0.064,-0.012] [0.023,0.069] [0.013,0.071]
logS0 0.322*** 0.389*** 0.518***
[0.307,0.338] [0.372,0.410] [0.492,0.556]
N-Children 9474 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , H, and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-cognitive
skills, home investments, and school investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 rep-
resent the beginning and the end of the kindergarten year. All models control for
age, age squared, mother’s years of education, and the number of days between the
two rounds of the data collection. Bootstrapped classroom-clustered 95% confidence
intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6: VA Skill Formation Estimates
logM1 logR1
logM0 0.796*** 0.258***
[0.778,0.820] [0.231,0.288]
logR0 0.074*** 0.559***
[0.046,0.100] [0.531,0.580]
logS0 0.317*** 0.381***
[0.301,0.334] [0.366,0.402]
N-Children 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, and school
investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 represent the beginning and the
end of the kindergarten year. All models control for child’s age, age squared,
and the number of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Boot-
strapped classroom-clustered 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. ***,
**, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.7: Skill Formation Estimates w. Complementarities
logM1 logR1 logN1
logM0 0.757*** 0.219*** 0.141***
[0.729,0.780] [0.195,0.247] [0.109,0.173]
logR0 0.064*** 0.552*** 0.030*
[0.036,0.089] [0.525,0.576] [-0.002,0.059]
logN0 0.081*** 0.074*** 0.764***
[0.061,0.102] [0.048,0.098] [0.729,0.797]
logS0 0.324*** 0.387*** 0.518***
[0.307,0.340] [0.371,0.412] [0.495,0.555]
logM0 × logS0 -0.037* -0.025* -0.032**
[-0.076,0.002] [-0.046,0.001] [-0.071,-0.005]
logR0 × logS0 -0.044*** -0.073*** -0.018
[-0.078,-0.012] [-0.092,-0.055] [-0.044,0.015]
logN0 × logS0 0.018 0.018 -0.019
[-0.006,0.046] [-0.006,0.049] [-0.053,0.018]
N-Children 9474 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-cognitive skills,
and school investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 represent the beginning and the
end of the kindergarten year. All models control for age, age squared, and the number
of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Bootstrapped classroom-clustered
95% confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from
zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Initial Conditions Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M0 (1) 1.00
R0 (2) 0.70 1.00
N0 (3) 0.54 0.48 1.00
SM,0 (4) 0.10 0.11 -0.07 1.00
SR,0 (5) 0.07 0.11 -0.09 0.45 1.00
SN,0 (6) -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 0.08 0.11 1.00
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M0, R0, and N0 represent mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive
skills at kindergarten entry, respectively. SM,0, SR,0, and SN,0 represent
school investments in mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills, re-
spectively. Results pertain to the baseline model with complementarities
(see Table 3.7).
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Table 3.9: Effect of School Investments on the Distribution of Skills at K-Exit
Counterfactual Std. Dev. 10−90 Gap
A: Mathematics Skills
baseline 0.95 2.42
mean quality for all classrooms 0.86 2.20
mean quality for classrooms below the mean 0.87 2.23
90pct quality for all classrooms 0.79 2.02
B: Reading Skills
baseline 0.90 2.30
mean quality for all classrooms 0.77 1.97
mean quality for classrooms below the mean 0.79 2.02
90pct quality for all classrooms 0.67 1.71
C: Non-cognitive Skills
baseline 0.96 2.48
mean quality for all classrooms 0.87 2.24
mean quality for classrooms below the mean 0.88 2.25
90pct quality for all classrooms 0.81 2.07
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Note: Results pertain to the baseline model with complementarities (see Table 3.7).
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Table 3.10: Effect of Investments in Kindergarten on Future Mathematics Outcomes
Spring G1 Spring G3 Spring G5 Spring G8
M0 0.508*** 0.553*** 0.535*** 0.443***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
R0 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.030** 0.071***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
N0 0.162*** 0.129*** 0.114*** 0.085***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
logSM,0 0.148*** 0.130*** 0.122*** 0.080***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
logSR,0 0.034*** 0.001 -0.010 0.006
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
logSN,0 0.032*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
N 8019 6934 5539 4697
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M0, R0, and N0 represent mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive scores at
kindergarten entry, respectively. Mathematics and reading scores are the raw scores. Non-
cognitive score is the Approaches to Learning evaluated by the teacher. SM,0, SR,0, and
SN,0 represent school investments in mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills, re-
spectively. School investments corresponds to the baseline model with complementarities
(see Table 3.7). Scores are rescaled to have standard deviation of 1. Classroom-clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.11: Selection on Observables - Baseline Technology
logM1 logR1 logN1
logM0 0.755*** 0.222*** 0.139***
[0.728,0.779] [0.194,0.251] [0.107,0.172]
logR0 0.056*** 0.542*** 0.031**
[0.027,0.082] [0.514,0.566] [0.002,0.059]
logN0 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.764***
[0.060,0.101] [0.046,0.098] [0.731,0.797]
logS0 0.321*** 0.387*** 0.517***
[0.306,0.337] [0.370,0.408] [0.491,0.555]
income (100k) 0.076*** 0.037* 0.075***
[0.031,0.118] [-0.007,0.079] [0.021,0.137]
N-Children 9474 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-cognitive
skills, and school investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 represent the begin-
ning and the end of the kindergarten year. All models control for age, age squared,
and the number of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Bootstrapped
classroom-clustered 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote
significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Selection on Observables - Generalized Technologies
logM1 logR1 logN1
A: with No Controls
income (100k) 0.730*** 0.605*** 0.500***
[0.667,0.793] [0.542,0.668] [0.419,0.581]
B: with Initial Skills
income (100k) 0.094*** 0.039 0.063**
[0.061,0.133] [-0.009,0.089] [0.005,0.138]
C: with Initial Skills and Schools
income (100k) 0.076*** 0.037* 0.075***
[0.031,0.118] [-0.007,0.079] [0.021,0.137]
D: with Initial Skills, Schools, and Parental Investments
income (100k) 0.058*** 0.022 0.069***
[0.014,0.102] [-0.023,0.063] [0.014,0.129]
E: with Initial Skills, Schools, Parental Investments, and Comp.
income (100k) 0.054*** 0.017 0.071***
[0.009,0.097] [-0.026,0.060] [0.017,0.132]
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regression. M1, R1, and N1 represent mathemat-
ics, reading, non-cognitive skills at the end of the kindergarten, respectively. All models control for
age, age squared, and the number of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Models
in Panels D and E control for mother’s years of education. Bootstrapped classroom-clustered 95%
confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.13: Determinants of Investments from School
SM,0 SR,0 SN,0
instructional time (hours/week) 0.011*** 0.028*** -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
number of students in class -0.016** -0.015** -0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
teacher has a graduate degree -0.079 0.024 0.025
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068)
teacher’s years of experience -0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N-Classrooms 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: SM,0, SR,0, and SN,0 represent school investments in mathematics, reading, and non-
cognitive skills, respectively. School investments corresponds to the baseline model including
parental investments and complementarities (see Table C.4). Regressions include indicators
for observations with missing values. School-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.14: Comparison of the Model Predictions with the STAR
Model STAR
Math Reading Math Reading
ATE | Non-Free Lunch 0.023 0.028 8.326 5.159
ATE | Free Lunch 0.031 0.037 9.816 8.128
Ratio 1.345 1.326 1.179 1.575
ATE | White 0.021 0.026 8.280 4.833
ATE | Non-White 0.030 0.037 9.838 9.609
Ratio 1.441 1.405 1.188 1.988
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data and the STAR.
Notes: ATE denotes the average treatment effect of the STAR.
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APPENDIX A
THE EFFECT OF BIRTH ORDER ON CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT
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A.1 Ceiling Effects
This section examines the sensitivity of the birth order effects on cognitive and
non-cognitive outcomes to the ceiling effects. Note that only a handful of children
score at the ceiling on cognitive outcomes. Specifically, 9 out of 2251, 1 out of 1960,
and 0 out of 2244 children score at the ceiling on the Letter-Word Identification, the
Paragraph Comprehension, and the Applied Problems test, respectively. In contrast,
a substantial proportion of children score at the ceiling on non-cognitive outcomes.
In particular, 1074 out of 2586 and 1927 out of 2586 score at the ceiling on the
Dependent and the Peer Problems scale, respectively. To examine the sensitivity of
the birth order effects to the ceiling effects, for each outcome I define an indicator
that takes the value of 1 if the child’s outcome is above the median conditional on
age, and 0 otherwise. Note that the defined dependent variables are not sensitive to
the range of the outcomes. I then re-estimate models in 1.1 and in 1.6 with the new
dependent variables. The tables show that the findings are qualitatively the same,
although some of the coefficients are imprecisely estimated.
Table A.1: Effect of Being Born Second on Outcomes
Outcome OLS FE
A: Cognitive Outcomes
Letter-Word Identification -0.083*** -0.179***
(0.025) [2251] (0.049) [2251]
Paragraph Comprehension -0.068*** -0.064
(0.025) [1960] (0.056) [1960]
Applied Problems -0.036 0.009
(0.024) [2244] (0.050) [2244]
B: Non-Cognitive Outcomes
Dependent -0.053** -0.088**
(0.021) [2586] (0.044) [2586]
Peer Problems -0.026 -0.051
(0.021) [2586] (0.043) [2586]
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regression. The scale of non-cognitive
outcomes is reversed so that a higher score is a better outcome. Each outcome is an indi-
cator for whether child’s test score is greater than the median conditional on age. Models
control for child’s gender, child’s age and age squared, mother’s years of education, and
mother’s age at birth. Number of children are in brackets. Household-clustered standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table A.2: Heterogeneity in Birth Order Effects
Cognitive Non-Cognitive
A: Estimates
1{birth order=2} -0.179*** -0.089*
(0.049) (0.050)
[-0.264,-0.097] [-0.165,-0.005]
q × 1{birth order=2} 0.011 0.007
(0.009) (0.011)
[-0.001,0.029] [-0.007,0.026]
B: Marginal Effects
Average -0.18 -0.09
Standard Deviation 0.11 0.01
N-Children 2251 2586
N-Households 1529 1747
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Cognitive outcome is Letter-Word identification test. Non-Cognitive outcome is De-
pendent scale. The scale of the non-cognitive outcome is reversed so that a higher score
is a better outcome. Each outcome is an indicator for whether child’s test score is greater
than the median conditional on age. q is the household fixed effect and is normalized to
have mean of zero standard deviation of one. Regressions control for child’s gender, child’s
age, and child’s age squared. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 90% con-
fidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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A.2 Adult Outcomes
This section merges the PSID-CDS with the Transition into Adulthood Supple-
ment (TAS) to examine the birth order effects on adult outcomes. The TAS is a
follow-up to the CDS. Its sample includes PSID participants who have completed
their CDS interviews and are between 18-28 years of age. It collects information on
education, employment, and income among other variables. After merging TAS with
PSID-CDS, I estimate models identical to the model in 1.1 with college attendance,
years of education, and log hourly wages as the dependent variable. The results show
no birth order effects on adult outcomes.
Table A.3: Effect of Being Born Second on Adult Outcomes
College Attendance Years of Education Log Hourly Wages
1{birth order=2} -0.013 0.006 -0.002
(0.026) (0.079) (0.072)
N-Children 1298 1517 928
N-Households 616 640 473
Source: the PSID-CDS-TAS.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regression. All models control for family fixed
effects, child’s gender, child’s age and age squared. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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A.3 Parental Passive Time
This section examines the birth order effects on parental passive time. The results
are qualitatively similar to the birth order effects on parental active time presented
in the main text.
Table A.4: Effect of Being Born Second on Passive Parental Time
Alone Shared
A: Maternal Time
1{birth order=2} -11.13*** 13.27***
(1.633) (1.405)
1{birth order=2} × age 1.66*** -2.25***
(0.327) (0.300)
1{birth order=2} × age2 -0.03** 0.06***
(0.015) (0.015)
Average Marginal Effects 1.880 -2.180
B: Paternal Time
1{birth order=2} -7.98*** 5.49***
(1.081) (1.060)
1{birth order=2} × age 1.00*** -0.71***
(0.225) (0.237)
1{birth order=2} × age2 -0.01 0.01
(0.011) (0.012)
Average Marginal Effects 0.714 -1.223
N-Children 2435 2435
N-Households 1744 1744
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Time is measured in hours per week. Models control for child’s gender,
child’s age and age squared, mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at
birth. Household-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * de-
note significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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A.4 Alternative Measures of Parental Investments
This section examines the effect of birth order on other measures of parental
investments available in the CDS, namely, the Household Tasks and the Parental
Warmth instruments. The Household Tasks is designed to measure parental interac-
tion with the children. The Parental Warmth is designed to measure the warmth of
the relationship between parents and children. Both of these measures are categor-
ical variables and ask parents for the frequency of a selected activities in a month.
The results demonstrate that parents read more to first-born children or help them
more with homework relative to second-born children. In addition, they have warmer
relationships with first-born children relative to second-born children.
Table A.5: Effect of Being Born Second on Parental Investments
Investment OLS FE
Household Tasks Index 1 -0.070* -0.060
(reading and homework) (0.041) (0.071)
[2587] [2587]
Household Tasks Index 2 0.097** 0.146**
(household chores) (0.040) (0.063)
[2587] [2587]
Parental Warmth Index 1 -0.078* 0.007
(appreciative words) (0.043) (0.060)
[2862] [2862]
Parental Warmth Index 2 -0.140*** -0.124*
(participation in child activities) (0.039) (0.066)
[2862] [2862]
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regression. Investments are
rescaled by standard deviation at age seven. Models control for child’s gender,
child’s age and age squared, mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at
birth. Number of children are in brackets. Household-clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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A.5 Children Allocation of Time
This section examines the effect of birth order on children’s allocation of time.
Second-born children spend about 1.2 hours per week more on watching TV relative to
their first-born siblings, which is about the amount of time that second-born children
receive less from their parents.
Table A.6: Effect of being Born Second on Children’s Allocation of Time
OLS
Sleeping 0.01
(0.39)
School -0.82
(0.59)
Watching TV 1.17***
(0.41)
Housework 0.31
(0.29)
Personal Care -0.42
(0.42)
Socializing 0.03
(0.25)
Leisure -0.38
(0.47)
Other 0.10
(0.20)
N-Children 2435
N-Households 1744
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Each entry is the estimate from a separate regres-
sion. Time is measured in hours per week. Models con-
trol for child’s gender, child’s age and age squared, mother’s
years of education, and mother’s age at birth. Household-
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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A.6 Augmented Sample
This section examines the effect of birth order on cognitive outcomes, non-cognitive
outcomes, and parental investments using an augmented sample. The Augmented
sample is defined as the baseline sample (households with two children) plus house-
holds with one or three children. The results demonstrates that the birth effects are
qualitatively the same in the augmented sample.
Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics in 1997
Mean Std. Dev.
A: Characteristics of Children
Number of children 2583
Age 6.66 3.75
Fraction male 0.50
Fraction White, Non-Hispanic 0.52
Fraction Black, Non-Hispanic 0.38
Fraction Hispanic 0.06
Fraction other Race/Ethnicity 0.05
Fraction living with both biological parents 0.64
Fraction living with only biological mother 0.32
Fraction living with only biological father 0.02
Fraction living with no biological parents 0.01
B: Characteristics of Households
Number of households 1804
Fraction having one child 0.17
Fraction having two children 0.48
Fraction having three childrens 0.35
Mother’s age 33.44 7.14
Mother’s age at first pregnancy 23.91 5.44
Mother’s years of schooling 13.75 2.13
Mother’s hours worked per week 24.34 17.14
Household income (10,000 1996USD) 4.72 4.64
Source: the PSID-CDS.
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Table A.8: Effect of Being Born Second on Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: OLS
1{birth order = 2} -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.138*** -0.114*** -0.091**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.044) (0.031) (0.042)
1{birth order = 3} -0.264*** -0.233*** -0.325*** -0.293*** -0.204***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.081) (0.057) (0.073)
B: FE
1{birth order = 2} -0.118** -0.150*** -0.191*** -0.161*** -0.057
(0.053) (0.058) (0.070) (0.058) (0.081)
1{birth order = 3} -0.295*** -0.337*** -0.353*** -0.423*** -0.152
(0.103) (0.111) (0.136) (0.112) (0.157)
N-Children 4659 4062 4650 5320 5320
N-Households 3452 3080 3446 3921 3921
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: Cognitive outcomes are: 1=Letter-Word, 2=Passage Comprehension, 3=Applied Problems.
Non-cognitive outcomes are: 4=Dependent, 5=Peer Problems. The scale of non-cognitive outcomes
is reversed so that a higher score is a better outcome. Outcomes are rescaled by standard deviation
at age seven. Models control for child’s gender, child’s age and age squared, number of children in
the household, mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at birth. Household-clustered standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Table A.9: Effect of Being Born Second on Active Parental Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{birth order = 2} -12.732*** 9.926*** -7.840*** 3.859***
(0.991) (0.726) (0.681) (0.513)
1{birth order = 3} -12.296*** 8.106*** -8.684*** 3.143***
(1.400) (1.358) (0.834) (1.034)
1{birth order = 2} × age 1.071*** -0.905*** 0.597*** -0.395***
(0.077) (0.057) (0.052) (0.042)
1{birth order = 3} × age 1.188*** -0.974*** 0.732*** -0.529***
(0.108) (0.099) (0.068) (0.071)
N-Children 4984 4984 4984 4984
N-Households 3637 3637 3637 3637
Source: the PSID-CDS.
Notes: 1=Maternal/Alone, 2=Maternal/Shared, 3=Paternal/Alone, 4=Paternal/Shared. Parental
times are measured in hours per week. Models control for child’s gender, child’s age and age
squared, number of children in the household, mother’s years of education, and mother’s age at
birth. Household-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly
different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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APPENDIX B
THE EFFECT OF CASH TRANSFERS ON BIRTH ORDER EFFECTS
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B.1 Details of the Estimates
This section provides the estimates of the underlying parameters of the model
with their standard errors, ω.
Table B.1: Estimates of Primitive Parameters (ω)
One-Child Two-Child
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
A: Cognitive Technology
last period skills intercept -0.9630 (0.1102) -0.3626 (0.0061)
last period skills slope 0.0556 (0.0062) 0.0181 (0.0005)
monetary investment intercept -0.8994 (0.5276) 0.6049 (0.2123)
monetary investment slope -0.2950 (0.0587) -0.9316 (0.1463)
alone time investment intercept 0.2062 (0.1610) -0.5522 (0.0449)
alone time investment slope -0.0887 (0.0086) -0.1321 (0.0068)
shared time investment intercept -1.0476 (0.0406)
shared time investment slope -0.0610 (0.0032)
B: Non-Cognitive Technology
last period skills intercept -0.2367 (0.0734) 0.0203 (0.0048)
last period skills slope 0.0134 (0.0041) -0.0071 (0.0009)
monetary investment intercept -37.1606 (90.2161) -1.8129 (0.5190)
monetary investment slope -0.0244 (0.1571) -0.6294 (0.2204)
alone time investment intercept -1.4940 (0.3146) -6.5315 (2.4542)
alone time investment slope -0.0812 (0.0227) -0.1675 (0.0793)
shared time investment intercept -4.0604 (0.0749)
shared time investment slope 0.1339 (0.0094)
C: Preferences
leisure 2.6891 (0.0589)
first child skills -0.1772 (0.0593)
second child skills 0.0007 (0.0004)
cognitive skills 0.0351 (0.0222)
terminal payoff to first child 0.5229 (0.1441)
terminal payoff to second child -0.6220 (0.3628)
Source: Model estimates using a sample of PSID-CDS data.
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
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B.2 Model with One Child
This section describes the model with one child. In addition, it provides an algo-
rithm to solve the model. Consider a household that has one child. Development of
the child takes M periods. Household’s life begins at t1 = 1 with birth of the child,
and ends at t2 = M + 1 when the development of the child ends. The timeline of
household’s life events is:
t1 = 1
Child’s Birth
Child’s Exit
t2 = M + 1
Preferences
Household’s preferences in time t follows a Cobb-Douglas form:
u(ct, `t, kt+1, nt+1) = α1 log ct + α2 log `t + α3α5 log kt+1 + α3(1− α5) log nt+1
where c is consumption, ` is time allocated to leisure, k is the cognitive skills, and n
is the non-cognitive skills. I assume that αj > 0 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
∑3
j=1 αj = 1, and
α5 ∈ (0, 1).
Technology
Cognitive and non-cognitive skills evolve according to the following technologies:
kt+1 = k
δ1,t
t e
δ2,t
t a
δ3,t
t
nt+1 = n
η1,t
t e
η2,t
t a
η3,t
t
where e is monetary investment and a is alone time investment.
Household’s Problem
Household’s problem in the sequence form is:
max
{ct,`t,et,at}Mt=1
M∑
t=1
βt−1u(ct, `t, kt+1, nt+1)
M∑
t=1
Rt−1(ct + et) = I
`t + at = τ ∀t
where β is discount factor, R is the gross interest rate, I is the sum of present value
of household’s income, and τ is the time endowment.
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Optimal Decisions
The optimal decisions are:
ct =
ϕ(ct)∑t2
t=1[ϕ(ct) + ϕ(et)]
T∑
t=1
R−(t−1)It
et =
ϕ(et)∑t2
t=1[ϕ(ct) + ϕ(et)]
T∑
t=1
R−(t−1)It
`t =
α2
α2 + ϕ(at)
τ
at =
ϕ(at)
α2 + ϕ(at)
τ
where ϕs are the lifetime marginal benefits,
ϕ(ct) = β
t−1Rt−1α1
ϕ(et) = β
t−1Rt−1
(
α3α5δ2,t(1 + φt) + α3(1− α5)η2,t(1 + ψt)
)
ϕ(at) =
(
α3α5δ3,t(1 + φt) + α3(1− α5)η3,t(1 + ψt)
)
where x is the future flows of an additional investment in cognitive skills, and y is
the future flows of an additional investments in non-cognitive skills.
φt =
T∑
i=t+1
βi−t
i∏
j=t+1
δ1,j
ψt =
T∑
i=t+1
βi−t
i∏
j=t+1
η1,j
Solving for the Optimal Decisions
In this part I demonstrate how to solve the model. For simplicity, consider a model
with three periods or t2 = 3. The household solves:
max
{ct,`t,et,at}3t=1
3∑
t=1
βt−1u(ct, `t, kt+1, nt+1)
c1 + e1 +R
−1(c2 + e2) +R−2(c3 + e3) = I
`t + at = τ ∀t
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The household’s objective function is:
U =
3∑
t=1
βt−1u =α1
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log ct + α2
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log `t
+α3α5
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log kt+1 + α3(1− α5)
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log nt+1
I use the lifetime monetary budget constraint, time budget constraints, and the
cognitive and non-cognitive technologies to convert the constrained optimization prob-
lem into an unconstraint optimization problem. First, using the lifetime budget con-
straint we have:
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log ct = log c1 + β log c2 + β2 log c3
= log(I − e1 −R−1(c2 + e2)−R−2(c3 + e3)) + β log c2 + β2 log c3
Second, using the time budget constraints substitute out leisure:
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log `t = log l1 + β log l2 + β2 log l3
= log(τ − a1) + β log(τ − a2) + β2 log(τ − a3)
Third, for the cognitive skills we have:
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log kt+1 =(1 + βδ1,2 + β2δ1,3δ1,2)(δ2,1 log e1 + δ3,1 log a1)
+ (β + β2δ1,3)(δ2,2 log e2 + δ3,2 log a2)
+ β2(δ2,3 log e3 + δ3,3 log a3)
similarly, for the non-cognitive skills:
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log nt+1 =(1 + βη1,2 + β2η1,3η1,2)(η2,1 log e1 + η3,1 log a1)
+ (β + β2η1,3)(η2,2 log e2 + η3,2 log a2)
+ β2(η2,3 log e3 + η3,3 log a3)
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Finally, substitute each element in the objective function:
U =
3∑
t=1
βt−1u =α1
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log ct + α2
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log `t
+ α3α5
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log kt+1 + α3(1− α5)
3∑
t=1
βt−1 log nt+1
=α1 log(I − e1 −R−1(c2 + e2)−R−2(c3 + e3)) + βα1 log c2 + β2α1 log c3
+ α2 log(τ − a1) + βα2 log(τ − a2) + β2α2 log(τ − a3)
+ α3α5(1 + βδ1,2 + β
2δ1,3δ1,2)(δ2,1 log e1 + δ3,1 log a1)
+ α3α5(β + β
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+ α3(1− α5)β2(η2,3 log e3 + η3,3 log a3)
First Order conditions
The first order conditions for consumption, monetary expenditures, leisure, and
parental time choices are listed below. These conditions along with the lifetime bud-
get constraint and the time budget constraints determine the optimal allocation of
resrouces.
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B.3 Monte Carlo Experiments
This section uses Monte Carlo exercises to examine the properties of the estima-
tor. I construct the true data generating process in two steps. First, I get the initial
conditions from the data. Then, I solve for the optimal choices given the initial condi-
tions, the preferences, and the technologies. In order to make observables comparable
with the actual data, I discard all information that are not observed in the data. In
particular, I only use the initial conditions at time t, time investments at time t,
cognitive and non-cognitive skills at time t and t+ 5, and household lifetime income.
Table B.2 displays the initial conditions. Figures B.1 and B.2 plot that the results
for one-child households. Figures B.3, B.4, and B.5 plot the results for two-child
households.
Table B.2: Initial Conditions
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A: One-Child Households
age, first child 215 8.30 2.57 3.00 12.00
cognitive skills, first child 215 30.19 15.09 1.00 55.00
non-cognitive skills, first child 215 2.57 0.41 1.00 3.00
lifetime income (10,000 USD) 215 6.48 3.21 0.50 21.36
B: Two-Child Households
age, first child 186 9.55 1.98 4.00 12.00
spacing 186 2.34 0.92 1.00 4.00
cognitive skills, first child 186 38.04 11.57 5.00 55.00
non-cognitive skills, first child 186 2.69 0.39 1.25 3.00
cognitive skills, second child 186 24.98 13.76 1.00 57.00
non-cognitive skills, second child 186 2.61 0.41 1.00 3.00
lifetime income (10,000 USD) 186 4.79 2.31 1.02 12.34
Source: the PSID-CDS.
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Figure B.1: One-Child Model; Technology of Cognitive Skills
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Source: Monte Carlo results.
Figure B.2: One-Child Model; Technology of Non-Cognitive Skills
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Source: Monte Carlo results.
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Figure B.3: Two-Child Model; Technology of Cognitive Skills
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Source: Monte Carlo results.
Note: The figure pertains to households with birth spacing
of one year.
126
Figure B.4: Two-Child Model; Technology of Non-Cognitive Skills
(a) First Born
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(b) Second Born
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Source: Monte Carlo results.
Note: The figure pertains to households with birth spacing
of one year.
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Figure B.5: Preference Parameters
α1 α2 α3α5 α3(1− α5) α4α5 α4(1− α5)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
estimate
true
initial
Source: Monte Carlo results.
Notes: α1 is the weight on consumption, α2 is the weight on leisure, α3 is the
weight on first child, α4 is the weight on second child, α5 is the weight on
cognitive skills, and 1− α5 is the weight on non-cognitive skills.
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APPENDIX C
SCHOOLS, PARENTS, AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
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C.1 Monte Carlo Experiments
This section uses Monte Carlo exercises to examine the properties of the estimator.
The true data generating process is assumed to be:
ln θi,t+1 = γ0 + γ1 ln θi,t + γ2 lnSi,t + γ3 ln θi,t lnSi,t + ηi,t (C.1)
lnSi,t ∼ N(0, 1) (C.2)
ln θi,t| lnSi,t ∼ N(0.6 lnSi,t, 1) (C.3)
ηi,t ∼ N(0, 0.3) (C.4)
where θi,t is the skill of child i at time t, lnSi,t is the investment from school, and
i,t is the error term. We assume that children are clustered by classrooms and we
observe multiple children per classroom. Further, we assume that investment from
school is the same for all children in the same classroom. We assume that ln θi,t is
not observed, but we observe two noisy measures of it:
ln yi,t = 0.95 ln θi,t + 0.3i,t (C.5)
ln zi,t = 0.95 ln θi,t + 0.3εi,t (C.6)
i,t ∼ N(0, 1) (C.7)
εi,t ∼ N(0, 1) (C.8)
where we have set the signal-to-noise ratio to 90%.
We fix some values for the number of classrooms, N , number of children per
classroom, n, and the true parameters; then, we generate 100 simulated dataset of N
classrooms with n children from the data generating process described above. Tables
C.1 reports the mean estimates and their 95% confidence intervals.
Table C.1: Monte Carlo Results
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3
A: Data Generating Process
1.000 0.300 2.000 0.150
B: Model Estimates
N = 100, n = 10 1.044 0.376 2.093 0.119
[1.021,1.069] [0.335,0.418] [2.038,2.165] [0.054,0.185]
N = 100, n = 20 1.030 0.339 2.092 0.131
[1.009,1.051] [0.305,0.372] [2.053,2.128] [0.092,0.172]
N = 100, n = 50 1.016 0.314 2.095 0.143
[1.002,1.031] [0.289,0.342] [2.071,2.123] [0.114,0.170]
Source: Monte Carlo results.
Notes: N and n denote number of classrooms and number of children per classroom, respectively.
95% confidence intervals are in parentheses.
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C.2 Sample Selection Algorithm
We select classrooms that have at least five children with two mathematics, two
reading, and two non-cognitive scores in the beginning and at the end of the kinder-
garten year, and two measures of home investments during the kindergarten year.
We begin our selection by dropping all non-responses in Fall (round 1) and Spring
(round 2) of the kindergarten year, and children who have changed school during the
year.
1. Drop all children who have a non-response status in round 1 or 2; i.e. children
with missing School ID.
2. Drop all children who have changed school between round 1 and 2; i.e. children
whose School ID in round 1 is different from School ID in round 2.
Next, we select children that have all the required information.
3. Drop all children who do not have two mathematics, two reading, and two non-
cognitive scores in rounds 1 and 2, and two measures of homes investments in
round 1.
We define a classroom to be the set of all children who have the same circumstances
in rounds 1 and 2. In the data, a classroom is a pair of Teacher ID and Class Time
(AM/PM/All Day). Teacher ID and/or Class Time may contain missing information
in a round, which means a teacher non-response. We allow for a missing Teacher
ID/Class Time to be a type in order to maximize the sample size. Finally, we select
the classrooms that have at least five observations:
4. Group Teacher ID 1, Class Time 1, Teacher ID 2, and Class Time 2; Then, drop
all classrooms that have fewer than five children.
Table C.2: Tabulation of Children by Algorithm Steps
Algorithm Step Children
did not respond in round 1, 2, or both 760
changed school between rounds 1 and 2 714
do not have full information 5,631
are in classrooms with fewer than 5 observations 4,830
remainder 9,474
total 21,409
Source: the ECLS.
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C.3 Measures of Home Investments
This section demonstrates that measures of investment from home are highly
correlated with the end-of-kindergarten skills, but once we control for children’s skills
at the beginning of the kindergarten year, their correlation goes to zero.
Table C.3: Correlation between Investments from Home and Future Outcomes
logM1 logR1 logN1
A: No Controls
logH0 0.131*** 0.222*** 0.215***
[0.097,0.167] [0.186,0.251] [0.166,0.252]
B: Controlling for Initial Skills
logM0 0.781*** 0.218*** 0.166***
[0.753,0.808] [0.191,0.244] [0.127,0.204]
logR0 0.071*** 0.583*** 0.007
[0.047,0.093] [0.564,0.603] [-0.024,0.041]
logN0 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.716***
[0.036,0.076] [0.028,0.080] [0.680,0.750]
logH0 -0.022 0.029*** 0.048***
[-0.042,0.002] [0.010,0.055] [0.018,0.073]
N-Children 9474 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , and H represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-cognitive skills, and home
investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 represent the beginning and the end of the kinder-
garten year. All models control for age, age squared, mother’s years of education, and the number
of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Bootstrapped Classroom-clustered 95%
confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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C.4 Models with Complementarities
This section provides the estimates for the baseline model including parental in-
vestments and the value-added model with complementarities.
Table C.4: Skill Formation Estimates w. Parental Investments and Comp.
logM1 logR1 logN1
logM0 0.750*** 0.215*** 0.140***
[0.723,0.777] [0.192,0.241] [0.106,0.175]
logR0 0.065*** 0.541*** 0.022
[0.038,0.088] [0.515,0.566] [-0.009,0.052]
logN0 0.083*** 0.073*** 0.762***
[0.062,0.103] [0.045,0.098] [0.730,0.796]
logH0 -0.043*** 0.041*** 0.046***
[-0.067,-0.013] [0.021,0.066] [0.011,0.071]
logS0 0.324*** 0.389*** 0.520***
[0.307,0.339] [0.372,0.414] [0.496,0.556]
logM0 × logS0 -0.039** -0.022 -0.036**
[-0.083,-0.003] [-0.042,0.005] [-0.080,-0.007]
logR0 × logS0 -0.036*** -0.075*** -0.012
[-0.069,-0.009] [-0.096,-0.058] [-0.043,0.023]
logN0 × logS0 0.019 0.017 -0.016
[-0.006,0.044] [-0.008,0.047] [-0.049,0.021]
logH0 × logS0 -0.027 0.008 -0.043**
[-0.051,0.005] [-0.014,0.033] [-0.076,-0.006]
N-Children 9474 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , H, and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-cognitive
skills, home investments, and school investments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 repre-
sent the beginning and the end of the kindergarten year. All models control for age, age
squared, mother’s years of education, and the number of days between the two rounds
of the data collection. Bootstrapped classroom-clustered 95% confidence intervals are in
brackets. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% lev-
els, respectively.
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Table C.5: VA Skill Formation Estimates w. Complementarities
logM1 logR1
logM0 0.792*** 0.252***
[0.768,0.817] [0.227,0.280]
logR0 0.080*** 0.567***
[0.052,0.103] [0.542,0.589]
logS0 0.316*** 0.378***
[0.299,0.333] [0.365,0.397]
logM0 × logS0 -0.025 -0.013
[-0.063,0.009] [-0.034,0.015]
logR0 × logS0 -0.038** -0.070***
[-0.068,-0.006] [-0.088,-0.053]
N-Children 9474 9474
N-Classroom 1211 1211
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, and school in-
vestments, respectively. Subscript 0 and 1 represent the beginning and the end
of the kindergarten year. All models control for child’s age, age squared, and
the number of days between the two rounds of the data collection. Bootstrapped
classroom-clustered 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. ***, **, and * de-
note significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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C.5 Details of the Elasticities
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the implied elasticities of skills
with respect to different inputs by the most general model.
Table C.6: Implied Elasticities
Mean Std. Dev. 10th-pct 90th-pct
Elasticity of M1 w.r.t.
M0 0.750 0.039 0.700 0.799
R0 0.065 0.036 0.019 0.110
N0 0.083 0.019 0.059 0.107
H0 -0.043 0.027 -0.077 -0.008
S0 0.325 0.070 0.235 0.414
Elasticity of R1 w.r.t.
M0 0.215 0.022 0.187 0.244
R0 0.541 0.075 0.445 0.638
N0 0.073 0.017 0.052 0.095
H0 0.041 0.008 0.031 0.052
S0 0.389 0.084 0.281 0.497
Elasticity of N1 w.r.t.
M0 0.140 0.036 0.094 0.185
R0 0.022 0.012 0.006 0.037
N0 0.762 0.016 0.741 0.783
H0 0.046 0.043 -0.010 0.102
S0 0.520 0.076 0.423 0.617
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M , R, N , H, and S represent mathematics skills, reading skills, non-
cognitive skills, home investments, and school investments, respectively. Sub-
script 0 and 1 represent the beginning and the end of the kindergarten year.
Elasticities pertain to model with parental investments and complementarities
(see table C.4).
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C.6 Effect of Investments in Kindergarten on Future Outcomes
This section examines the effects of the school investments during the kindergarten
year on children’s future outcomes. The results demonstrates that our estimated
investments in kindergarten predict children’s future outcomes.
Table C.7: Effect of Investments in Kindergarten on Future Reading Outcomes
Spring G1 Spring G3 Spring G5 Spring G8
M0 0.253*** 0.337*** 0.353*** 0.354***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
R0 0.261*** 0.194*** 0.225*** 0.124***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
N0 0.196*** 0.135*** 0.103*** 0.121***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
logSM,0 0.091*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.046**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
logSR,0 0.143*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.021
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
logSN,0 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.031** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
N 8021 6897 5537 4678
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M0, R0, and N0 represent mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive scores at
kindergarten entry, respectively. Mathematics and reading scores are the raw scores. Non-
cognitive score is the Approaches to Learning evaluated by the teacher. SM,0, SR,0, and
SN,0 represent school investments in mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive skills, re-
spectively. School investments corresponds to the baseline model with complementarities
(see Table 3.7). Scores are rescaled to have standard deviation of 1. Classroom-clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.8: Effect of Investments in Kindergarten on Future Non-Cognitive Outcomes
Spring G1 Spring G3 Spring G5
M0 0.171*** 0.177*** 0.139***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
R0 0.096*** 0.057*** 0.028
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
N0 0.376*** 0.351*** 0.327***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
logSM,0 0.020 0.026 0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
logSR,0 0.025 0.049*** 0.029
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
logSN,0 0.103*** 0.060*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
N 7473 6023 5342
Source: Model estimates using a sample of ECLS data.
Notes: M0, R0, and N0 represent mathematics, reading, and non-cognitive
scores at kindergarten entry, respectively. Mathematics and reading scores are
the raw scores. Non-cognitive score is the Approaches to Learning evaluated
by the teacher. SM,0, SR,0, and SN,0 represent school investments in mathe-
matics, reading, and non-cognitive skills, respectively. School investments cor-
responds to the baseline model with complementarities (see Table 3.7). Scores
are rescaled to have standard deviation of 1. Classroom-clustered standard er-
rors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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